Sunday, August 31, 2008
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Certifications for Out of State Witnesses
Back when it was expected that Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes' trial was going to start on September 2, 2008, the Distrtict Attorneys office filed the following certifications for out of state witnesses on 08/08/2008. While the trial date has been postponed to January 5, 2009, it's almost a given that these same people/witnesses will still be attending:
CERTIFICATION
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is scheduled to commence criminal prosecution of Joseph Kerekes and Harlow Cuadra at trial which commences September 2, 2008 in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, 200 N. River Street, Wilkes-Barr; Pennsylvania 18711. [Witness name and address] is a material witness for the Commonwealth and his attendance at the aforesaid trial scheduled to commence September 2, 2008 and lasting through the month of September 2008. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requests that in the event that the witness is uncooperative, that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to ensure his inclusive attendance at the Pennsylvania trial proceedings as per Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 522 and all relevant comments thereto and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5964 relating to witnesses from another state summoned to testify in this Commonwealth. The Commonwealth certifies the compulsory attendance of this witness is not for the purpose of serving said witness with process from another civil or criminal proceeding. The Commonwealth hereby waives its right to serve said witness with process, civil or criminal, by virtue of the witness' attendance/presence in Pennsylvania in this matter. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall provide transportation, lodging and meals for this witness.
- Elena Arosemena from Cox Communications
- Michelle Mar from USA People Search
- Harry Strait
- Tony Parrow from Springhill Suites by Marriott
- Phillipino Romano from Springhill Suites by Marriott
- Chris Hurd from DVInfo.net
- Jeffrey Standford from Yahoo!, Inc.
- Angela Evans from ALLTEL
- Heather Ramos from Sprint Nextel
- Donna Plasmere from America Online
- Matthew Brannon
- Thomas Lampman
- Troy Prickett
- Adam Grieber
- Paulette Bartholomew from Cellco Partners, dba Verizon Wireless
- Petra Ungvarson from Rolex Corporation
- Designated Custodian of Records from JR Video
- David Michaels aka David Mitchell
- Nep Malaki
This list does not include those witnesses that have already been summoned, such as Renee Martin, Grant Roy, etc... I'll compile a complete list once we get closer to the trial date, as I fully expect we'll be seeing some additional names added.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Another Piece of the Puzzle

This is an excerpt from a "Certificate of Judge of Requesting State for Attendance of Out of State Witness" dated 08/07/08... originally scheduled for Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes' September trial, which we all now know has been moved to January 5, 2009. I'm pretty certain these same two witnesses will be in attendance for the new trial date:
"3. The Commonwealth alleges that Philip Romano and Tony Parrow of Marriott Spring Hill Suites, 6350 Newtown Road, Norfolk, Virginia, are necessary and material witnesses for the State of Pennsylvania for the reason that the Commonweatlh asserts the murderers fled to the Marriott and hid from Law Enforcement shortly after the homicide. The Commonwealth further alleges that the murderers stayed at this Marriott until they absconed to Miami Beach, Florida."
If nothing else, this helps to answer the question as to where Harlow and Joe were before heading to South Beach/Miami.
"3. The Commonwealth alleges that Philip Romano and Tony Parrow of Marriott Spring Hill Suites, 6350 Newtown Road, Norfolk, Virginia, are necessary and material witnesses for the State of Pennsylvania for the reason that the Commonweatlh asserts the murderers fled to the Marriott and hid from Law Enforcement shortly after the homicide. The Commonwealth further alleges that the murderers stayed at this Marriott until they absconed to Miami Beach, Florida."
If nothing else, this helps to answer the question as to where Harlow and Joe were before heading to South Beach/Miami.
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
DA's Supplemental Brief in Response to Motions for Severance
COMMONWEALTH’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS CUADRA’S AND KEREKES’ JOINT BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SEVERANCE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Joseph Kerekes duly filed a Notice of Alibi defense indicating that he was at the Fox Ridge Inn the evening of January 24, 2007. Mr. Kerekes had signed in the hotel the evening before, noting that there would be two occupants.
Co-Defendant Harlow Cuadra flIed an untimely Notice of Alibi defense stating be was at the Fox Ridge Inn on January 24, 2007.
In conclusory fashion, Defense Counsel broadly asserts the defenses are antagonistic without reference to any facts.
In Commonwealth. v. Jones 610 A.2d 93 530 Pa 591 (Pa., 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote, “There is nothing inherently antagonistic about alibi defenses being used by multiple defendants.”
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Defendants have shown actual prejudice from consolidated cases so as to warrant severance?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: NO.
2. Whether or not the Virginia Beach prison intercepts are admissible as adoptive admissions where the Defendant Cuadra, responding to Defendant Kerekes, states:
a. JOSEPH KEREKES: Listen we have to go to Plan B, we went there.
HARLOW CUADRA: Alright, airight. Hey Joe, don’t don’t say anything over the phone, I already need to, I already know.
b. JOSEPH KEREKES: Harlow, it’s pretty, it’s pretty much what we already know, remember what Plan B was, right?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Okay, and umm...
HARLOW CUADRA: Oh boy.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Because we can’t get any...we have to tell, ya know what I mean?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Are you good with that?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, I’m good, I’m good.
c. JOSEPH KEREKES: Do you remember though what is was, you, you had an appointment, I mean..
HARLOW CUADRA: I know, I know, I know...
JOSEPH KEREKES: Egh, Egh, Egh, Egh.
HARLOW CUADRA: I, I, I know, I know Joe.
JOSEPH KEREKES: And I wasn’t there.
HARLOW CUADRA: Everything, everything’s in my head, just be very calm, alright?
d. JOSEPH KEREKES: Hey Harlow, when I’m off the phone here she’s gonna explain to you the hypothetical okay?
HARLOW CUADRA: Okay.
e. JOSEPH KEREKES: So Harlow pretty much knows the hypothetical story, right?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: YES.
ARGUMENT AND LAW
A. The Defendants’ Alibi Defenses Do Not Warrant Severance In Commonwealth. v. Jones 610 A.2d 931, 530 Pa 591 (Pa., 1992), a capital case with thee defendants, the Defendant Jones claimed a severance was warranted because both he and his co defendant presented alibi defenses and it was possible that appellant’s defense might be prejudiced by conflicts with testimony presented by the co-defendants. The Supreme Court wrote:
“Appellant’s first contention is that a motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants was erroneously denied. The record is silent as to the circumstances surrounding the denial of appellant’s motion for severance. The motion was not denied by the trial court, but rather by another judge. Appellant has not cited anything in the record indicating the grounds on which the motion rested. The trial court, in preparing its opinion for purposes of this appeal, expressed uncertainty as to the grounds asserted for severance. It speculated that appellant presented his motion to a calendar control judge in proceedings not transcribed, but acknowledged that appellant may have at some time during trial presented a renewed oral motion for severance.”
“Nevertheless, appellant claims that severance would have spared him prejudice from testimony given by certain alibi witnesses who appeared on behalf of codefendant Givens. Numerous alibi witnesses testified that Givens was not in the courtyard at the time of the shootings. Three of these testified further, however, that they saw appellant and Robertson commit the shootings. Appellant claims therefore that his own defense, which was one of alibi, was inherently contradictory with Givens’ defense. While the record provides no basis to determine the grounds actually asserted for severance, we believe that if, as appellant infers, the motion for severance was based on the possibility that appellant’s defense might be prejudiced by conflicts with testimony presented by the codefendants, the motion was properly denied.” Id.
“It is well established that a motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. 578, 589-90, 587 A.2d 1367, 1372-73 (1991), cert. denied, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 152, 442, 116 L.Ed.2d 442 (1991). Where, as was the case here, defendants have been charged with conspiracy, joint rather than separate trials are to be preferred. Id. Commonwealth v. Jackson 451 Pa. 462, 464, 303 A.2d 924, 925 (1973) (joint trials are advisable where multiple defendants are charged with participation in the same criminal acts and much of the same evidence is necessary or applicable to all of the defendants). severance may nevertheless be proper where a defendant can show that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial. Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1372-73.” Id.
“Although the possibility of conflicting defenses is a factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant severance, it is clear that more than a bare assertion of conflict is required. Id. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1373. As stated Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1373, “ mere fact that there is hostility between defendants, or that one may try to save himself at the ex of another, is in itself not sufficient grounds to require separate trials. Further, “defenses become antagonistic only when the jury, in order to believe the essence of testimony offered on behalf of one defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony of his co defendant.” Id.
“Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident that the essence of Givens’ defense was his own non-participation in the crime rather than the involvement of appellant and Robertson. Givens presented many witnesses in support of his defense of alibi, and, of these, only three testified that appellant was involved in the crime. Givens testified in support of his own alibi defense, and he did not, in any way, implicate appellant. Thus, the core of Givens’ defense was one of alibi, as was the core of appellant’s defense. There is nothing inherently antagonistic about alibi defnses being used by multiple defendants”. Id.
“While portions of the testimony provided by a few of Givens’ alibi witnesses indeed proved to be at odds with appellant’s defense that he was not at the scene of the crime, the record does not reveal whether such a conflict was made known to the court when the motion for severance was offered. Even assuming that the conflict was made known, the testimony would not have so affected appellant’s defense as to render the decision not to sever the trials a manifest abuse of discretion.”
“If the severance motion had been granted the Commonwealth would likely have been able, if it desired, to introduce testimony against appellant from the same three witnesses in a separate trial. Hence, granting the motion to sever would not have insulated appellant from the testimony in question.” Id.
“Further, the testimony was of very doubtful significance, since the Commonwealth produced six or more of its own witnesses who testified that they saw appellant commit the shootings. Quite obviously, too, Givens’ alibi witnesses were not believed by the jury. If they had been believed, Givens would not have been found guilty. It is most unlikely, therefore, that their testimony played any role in appellant’s conviction.” Id.
“Thus, the three defendants were charged with conspiracy, making a joint trial advisable. Much of the evidence pertained to all three defendants, rather than to just one. The testimony given by a few of Givens’ alibi witnesses, even if the adverse nature of it had been foreseen at the time the motion for severance was made, was not such as would have necessitated that the defendants be tried separately. Further, the trial was a very lengthy one, consuming more than two months. It was characterized by the trial court as one of the most time-consuming homicide trials ever conducted in Philadelphia. A record in excess of seven thousand pages was produced. To have conducted separate trials for the codefendants in this case would have placed a heavy burden upon the judicial system as well as upon the public. Based upon these considerations, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for severance.” Id.
In Clark v. O’Dea 257 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001), Clark argued that he was improperly joined for trial with co-defendant Hardin. He alleges that standing trial with Hardin substantially prejudiced him, because most of the evidence of satanism related only to Hardin and not to him. Specifically, the prosecution elicited testimony about a sketch book of sacrilegious drawings, a handwritten book of spells, and a satanic poem. These items, however, were all possessions of Hardin, not Clark Similarly, Clark argues that testimony about the threat that Hardin made to Warford related only to Hardin, and not to himself.
The Clark court wrote: “This court has held, in a Sixth Amendment habeas challenge, that a defendant must show both (1) an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and (2) compelling and specific prejudice in order to successfully challenge the joinder of his trial with that of a codefendant. Jenkins v. Bordenkircher 611 F.2d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, we have found no compelling and specific prejudice where a codefendant’s testimony did not expressly implicate the defendant. United States v. Sherlin 67 F.3d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that, in a federal prosecution, the admission of a confession by Sherlin’s codefendant did not violate Sherlin’s confrontation rights where his name was redacted from the codefendant’s confession and the confession did not expressly implicate Sherlin).”
“No compelling and specific prejudice to Clark’s case has been shown here. Clark and Hardin do not even present mutually antagonistic defenses. Instead, both defendants presented essentially the same alibi defense to the jury - that they were with each other at another location on the evening of the murder. At most, testimony about Hardin’s satanism and threats towards Warford only implicate Clark by association, not by direct reference But the fact that there “is a substantial difference in the amount of evidence adduced against each defendant is not grounds to overturn a denial of severance unless there is a substantial risk that the jury could not compartmentalize or distinguish between the evidence against each defendant.” 14. citing United States v. Lloyd 10 F.3d 1197, 1215 (6th Cir. 1993).
The court went on to write, “In the present case, a jury could easily separate the testimony against Hardin from the testimony against Clark, because the testimony about Hardin’s threats and satanic paraphernalia was not particularly complex. See 14. at 1216 (upholding the joint trial of several defendants in a prosecution for drug trafficking because “this case, while lengthy, was not a case of such complexity that the jury could not compartmentalize the evidence”). Indeed, the state court had ample reasons to try Clark and Hardin together, because they both were charged with committing the same crime. Buchanan v. Kentucky 483 U.S. 402, 418 (1987) (recognizing that the state has an interest in proceeding with joint trials where “all of the crimes charged against the joined defendants arise out of one chain of events, where there is a single victim, and where, in fact, the defendants are indicted on several of the same counts”).”
“Nor has Clark demonstrated that the Kentucky Supreme Court, in allowing Clark and Hardin to be jointly tried, based its decision on “an unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law” as required for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In a prior case, the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically declared that the mere introduction of evidence that is competent as to one defendant and incompetent as to the other is not in and of itself grounds to grant a severance... [O]rdinarily there must be some additional factor, such as that the defendants have antagonistic defenses, or that the evidence as to one defendant tends directly to incriminate the other, e.g., one defendant's admissions directly implicate the other.” Id. citing Compton v. Commonwealth 602 S.W.2d 150, 152-23 (Ky. 1980).
“Here, Clark presented no additional factors. The evidence against Hardin -- his satanic paraphernalia and threats against Warford -- did not directly implicate Clark in Hardin’s actions. Any implication of Clark comes indirectly through Clark’s association with Hardin. Skinner v. Commonwealth 864 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1993) (holding that the defendant failed to establish that he should have been tried separately from his codefendants, despite his contention that he was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence about his codefendants’ misdeeds). Because the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Clark’s appeal falls within the realm of plausible and credible results, and is not unreasonable in its analysis of law or fact, we reject Clark’s habeas challenge to the joinder of his trial with that of Hardin.”
In this case, Cuadra’s and Kerekes’ alibi defenses are consistent. Neither defendant is pointing the finger at the other, Neither defendant is saying the other committed any crime whatsoever. The alibi defenses are consistent, compatible, congruent, and commensurate with each other. In fact, Defendant Kerekes, the evening before the homicide, even indicated that TWO people would be in the room on the Fox Ridge Inn registration slip.
B. The Virginia Beach Prison Intercepts are Admissible as Adoptive Admissions
To clarify for Defense Counsel, the Virginia Beach prison tapes are offered as adoptive admissions. The adoptive admission is a separate concept from the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
The twenty-fifth exception listed within Rule 803 is designated, “Admisison by Party-Opponent,” and it encompasses both of the exceptions urged by the Commonwealth, is as follows:
“(25) Admission by Party-Opponent
The statement is offered against a party and is... (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth,...” Furthermore, a person is considered to have adopted the conspiracy and can be held liable for the actions of others involved in the conspiracy. “Once there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of this conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Lambert 795 A.2d 1010 (Super.2002), appeal denied 805 A 521. “Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may be liable under conspiracy theory, for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.” Commonwealth v. Murphy 844 A 1228 (Super.2004).
Kerekes outlines Plan B to Renee Martin. Cuadra is not a participant to that conversation. See conversation #98 of “Transcripts of Intercepted Telephone Calls at the Virginia Beach Correctional Facility” (filed by the Commonwealth as a bound exhibit on July 7, 2008). (Note: The Commonwealth intends to redact the following phrases from that conversation on page 23:
JOSEPH KEREKES: Well, well why isn’t Harlow calling is he with Brice now?
RENEE MARTIN: Yea, yea, he’s with Brice now.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Well how do you know that?
RENEE MARTIN: Umm, because I talked to Jim Brice and he said he was going in to see Harlow, he’d call me back.)
The Commonwealth also intends to redact intercepted call #99 (also in the bound filing), an intercepted conversation between Joseph Kerekes and Renee Martin, as follows:
At page 37, Joseph Kerekes states, “... ya know and even the day of the supposed meeting when I thought that he would do business with this man, I said Harlow, do you really think we need to do this business with man, we have our own company, do we need to do this business with this man, anyways, this is all stuff Harlow will verify I sure, if it ever has to be.” The Commonwealth would seek to delete the italicized portion of Defendant Kerekes’ statement for trial (“I said Harlow” to the end of the statement would be deleted).
At page 38 of the same conversation, Defendant Kerekes states, “Umm, a very small bottle of liquid, that you might use at a picnic. Yes, you know... and umm, I said Harlow.” The Commonwealth would seek to delete the “I said Harlow” portion of the statement for trial. By removing those two references, that particular conversation would not identify Harlow, and the Commonwealth submits the conversation should be admissible at a joint trial.
Thereafter, in conversation #101 at pages 43-45: #101-103 at page 49; and #104 (all contained in the Commonwealth’s bound filing), Cuadra, responding to Kerekes, adopts Plan B as outlined above on page 2. The intercepted conversations from the Virginia Beach prison outlined above, and within the above-referenced Commonwealth filing, are adoptive admissions. Both Defendants are adopting ‘Plan B’ as a common scheme or design. The conversations are also evidence of the Defendants adopting the conspiracy. The Commonwealth submits that the statements are admissible against both parties and their use is not grounds for severance.
Joseph Kerekes duly filed a Notice of Alibi defense indicating that he was at the Fox Ridge Inn the evening of January 24, 2007. Mr. Kerekes had signed in the hotel the evening before, noting that there would be two occupants.
Co-Defendant Harlow Cuadra flIed an untimely Notice of Alibi defense stating be was at the Fox Ridge Inn on January 24, 2007.
In conclusory fashion, Defense Counsel broadly asserts the defenses are antagonistic without reference to any facts.
In Commonwealth. v. Jones 610 A.2d 93 530 Pa 591 (Pa., 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote, “There is nothing inherently antagonistic about alibi defenses being used by multiple defendants.”
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Defendants have shown actual prejudice from consolidated cases so as to warrant severance?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: NO.
2. Whether or not the Virginia Beach prison intercepts are admissible as adoptive admissions where the Defendant Cuadra, responding to Defendant Kerekes, states:
a. JOSEPH KEREKES: Listen we have to go to Plan B, we went there.
HARLOW CUADRA: Alright, airight. Hey Joe, don’t don’t say anything over the phone, I already need to, I already know.
b. JOSEPH KEREKES: Harlow, it’s pretty, it’s pretty much what we already know, remember what Plan B was, right?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Okay, and umm...
HARLOW CUADRA: Oh boy.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Because we can’t get any...we have to tell, ya know what I mean?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Are you good with that?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, I’m good, I’m good.
c. JOSEPH KEREKES: Do you remember though what is was, you, you had an appointment, I mean..
HARLOW CUADRA: I know, I know, I know...
JOSEPH KEREKES: Egh, Egh, Egh, Egh.
HARLOW CUADRA: I, I, I know, I know Joe.
JOSEPH KEREKES: And I wasn’t there.
HARLOW CUADRA: Everything, everything’s in my head, just be very calm, alright?
d. JOSEPH KEREKES: Hey Harlow, when I’m off the phone here she’s gonna explain to you the hypothetical okay?
HARLOW CUADRA: Okay.
e. JOSEPH KEREKES: So Harlow pretty much knows the hypothetical story, right?
HARLOW CUADRA: Yea, yea.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: YES.
ARGUMENT AND LAW
A. The Defendants’ Alibi Defenses Do Not Warrant Severance In Commonwealth. v. Jones 610 A.2d 931, 530 Pa 591 (Pa., 1992), a capital case with thee defendants, the Defendant Jones claimed a severance was warranted because both he and his co defendant presented alibi defenses and it was possible that appellant’s defense might be prejudiced by conflicts with testimony presented by the co-defendants. The Supreme Court wrote:
“Appellant’s first contention is that a motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants was erroneously denied. The record is silent as to the circumstances surrounding the denial of appellant’s motion for severance. The motion was not denied by the trial court, but rather by another judge. Appellant has not cited anything in the record indicating the grounds on which the motion rested. The trial court, in preparing its opinion for purposes of this appeal, expressed uncertainty as to the grounds asserted for severance. It speculated that appellant presented his motion to a calendar control judge in proceedings not transcribed, but acknowledged that appellant may have at some time during trial presented a renewed oral motion for severance.”
“Nevertheless, appellant claims that severance would have spared him prejudice from testimony given by certain alibi witnesses who appeared on behalf of codefendant Givens. Numerous alibi witnesses testified that Givens was not in the courtyard at the time of the shootings. Three of these testified further, however, that they saw appellant and Robertson commit the shootings. Appellant claims therefore that his own defense, which was one of alibi, was inherently contradictory with Givens’ defense. While the record provides no basis to determine the grounds actually asserted for severance, we believe that if, as appellant infers, the motion for severance was based on the possibility that appellant’s defense might be prejudiced by conflicts with testimony presented by the codefendants, the motion was properly denied.” Id.
“It is well established that a motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. 578, 589-90, 587 A.2d 1367, 1372-73 (1991), cert. denied, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 152, 442, 116 L.Ed.2d 442 (1991). Where, as was the case here, defendants have been charged with conspiracy, joint rather than separate trials are to be preferred. Id. Commonwealth v. Jackson 451 Pa. 462, 464, 303 A.2d 924, 925 (1973) (joint trials are advisable where multiple defendants are charged with participation in the same criminal acts and much of the same evidence is necessary or applicable to all of the defendants). severance may nevertheless be proper where a defendant can show that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial. Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1372-73.” Id.
“Although the possibility of conflicting defenses is a factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant severance, it is clear that more than a bare assertion of conflict is required. Id. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1373. As stated Commonwealth v. Chester 526 Pa. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1373, “ mere fact that there is hostility between defendants, or that one may try to save himself at the ex of another, is in itself not sufficient grounds to require separate trials. Further, “defenses become antagonistic only when the jury, in order to believe the essence of testimony offered on behalf of one defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony of his co defendant.” Id.
“Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident that the essence of Givens’ defense was his own non-participation in the crime rather than the involvement of appellant and Robertson. Givens presented many witnesses in support of his defense of alibi, and, of these, only three testified that appellant was involved in the crime. Givens testified in support of his own alibi defense, and he did not, in any way, implicate appellant. Thus, the core of Givens’ defense was one of alibi, as was the core of appellant’s defense. There is nothing inherently antagonistic about alibi defnses being used by multiple defendants”. Id.
“While portions of the testimony provided by a few of Givens’ alibi witnesses indeed proved to be at odds with appellant’s defense that he was not at the scene of the crime, the record does not reveal whether such a conflict was made known to the court when the motion for severance was offered. Even assuming that the conflict was made known, the testimony would not have so affected appellant’s defense as to render the decision not to sever the trials a manifest abuse of discretion.”
“If the severance motion had been granted the Commonwealth would likely have been able, if it desired, to introduce testimony against appellant from the same three witnesses in a separate trial. Hence, granting the motion to sever would not have insulated appellant from the testimony in question.” Id.
“Further, the testimony was of very doubtful significance, since the Commonwealth produced six or more of its own witnesses who testified that they saw appellant commit the shootings. Quite obviously, too, Givens’ alibi witnesses were not believed by the jury. If they had been believed, Givens would not have been found guilty. It is most unlikely, therefore, that their testimony played any role in appellant’s conviction.” Id.
“Thus, the three defendants were charged with conspiracy, making a joint trial advisable. Much of the evidence pertained to all three defendants, rather than to just one. The testimony given by a few of Givens’ alibi witnesses, even if the adverse nature of it had been foreseen at the time the motion for severance was made, was not such as would have necessitated that the defendants be tried separately. Further, the trial was a very lengthy one, consuming more than two months. It was characterized by the trial court as one of the most time-consuming homicide trials ever conducted in Philadelphia. A record in excess of seven thousand pages was produced. To have conducted separate trials for the codefendants in this case would have placed a heavy burden upon the judicial system as well as upon the public. Based upon these considerations, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for severance.” Id.
In Clark v. O’Dea 257 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001), Clark argued that he was improperly joined for trial with co-defendant Hardin. He alleges that standing trial with Hardin substantially prejudiced him, because most of the evidence of satanism related only to Hardin and not to him. Specifically, the prosecution elicited testimony about a sketch book of sacrilegious drawings, a handwritten book of spells, and a satanic poem. These items, however, were all possessions of Hardin, not Clark Similarly, Clark argues that testimony about the threat that Hardin made to Warford related only to Hardin, and not to himself.
The Clark court wrote: “This court has held, in a Sixth Amendment habeas challenge, that a defendant must show both (1) an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and (2) compelling and specific prejudice in order to successfully challenge the joinder of his trial with that of a codefendant. Jenkins v. Bordenkircher 611 F.2d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, we have found no compelling and specific prejudice where a codefendant’s testimony did not expressly implicate the defendant. United States v. Sherlin 67 F.3d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that, in a federal prosecution, the admission of a confession by Sherlin’s codefendant did not violate Sherlin’s confrontation rights where his name was redacted from the codefendant’s confession and the confession did not expressly implicate Sherlin).”
“No compelling and specific prejudice to Clark’s case has been shown here. Clark and Hardin do not even present mutually antagonistic defenses. Instead, both defendants presented essentially the same alibi defense to the jury - that they were with each other at another location on the evening of the murder. At most, testimony about Hardin’s satanism and threats towards Warford only implicate Clark by association, not by direct reference But the fact that there “is a substantial difference in the amount of evidence adduced against each defendant is not grounds to overturn a denial of severance unless there is a substantial risk that the jury could not compartmentalize or distinguish between the evidence against each defendant.” 14. citing United States v. Lloyd 10 F.3d 1197, 1215 (6th Cir. 1993).
The court went on to write, “In the present case, a jury could easily separate the testimony against Hardin from the testimony against Clark, because the testimony about Hardin’s threats and satanic paraphernalia was not particularly complex. See 14. at 1216 (upholding the joint trial of several defendants in a prosecution for drug trafficking because “this case, while lengthy, was not a case of such complexity that the jury could not compartmentalize the evidence”). Indeed, the state court had ample reasons to try Clark and Hardin together, because they both were charged with committing the same crime. Buchanan v. Kentucky 483 U.S. 402, 418 (1987) (recognizing that the state has an interest in proceeding with joint trials where “all of the crimes charged against the joined defendants arise out of one chain of events, where there is a single victim, and where, in fact, the defendants are indicted on several of the same counts”).”
“Nor has Clark demonstrated that the Kentucky Supreme Court, in allowing Clark and Hardin to be jointly tried, based its decision on “an unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law” as required for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In a prior case, the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically declared that the mere introduction of evidence that is competent as to one defendant and incompetent as to the other is not in and of itself grounds to grant a severance... [O]rdinarily there must be some additional factor, such as that the defendants have antagonistic defenses, or that the evidence as to one defendant tends directly to incriminate the other, e.g., one defendant's admissions directly implicate the other.” Id. citing Compton v. Commonwealth 602 S.W.2d 150, 152-23 (Ky. 1980).
“Here, Clark presented no additional factors. The evidence against Hardin -- his satanic paraphernalia and threats against Warford -- did not directly implicate Clark in Hardin’s actions. Any implication of Clark comes indirectly through Clark’s association with Hardin. Skinner v. Commonwealth 864 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1993) (holding that the defendant failed to establish that he should have been tried separately from his codefendants, despite his contention that he was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence about his codefendants’ misdeeds). Because the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Clark’s appeal falls within the realm of plausible and credible results, and is not unreasonable in its analysis of law or fact, we reject Clark’s habeas challenge to the joinder of his trial with that of Hardin.”
In this case, Cuadra’s and Kerekes’ alibi defenses are consistent. Neither defendant is pointing the finger at the other, Neither defendant is saying the other committed any crime whatsoever. The alibi defenses are consistent, compatible, congruent, and commensurate with each other. In fact, Defendant Kerekes, the evening before the homicide, even indicated that TWO people would be in the room on the Fox Ridge Inn registration slip.
B. The Virginia Beach Prison Intercepts are Admissible as Adoptive Admissions
To clarify for Defense Counsel, the Virginia Beach prison tapes are offered as adoptive admissions. The adoptive admission is a separate concept from the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
The twenty-fifth exception listed within Rule 803 is designated, “Admisison by Party-Opponent,” and it encompasses both of the exceptions urged by the Commonwealth, is as follows:
“(25) Admission by Party-Opponent
The statement is offered against a party and is... (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth,...” Furthermore, a person is considered to have adopted the conspiracy and can be held liable for the actions of others involved in the conspiracy. “Once there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of this conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Lambert 795 A.2d 1010 (Super.2002), appeal denied 805 A 521. “Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may be liable under conspiracy theory, for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.” Commonwealth v. Murphy 844 A 1228 (Super.2004).
Kerekes outlines Plan B to Renee Martin. Cuadra is not a participant to that conversation. See conversation #98 of “Transcripts of Intercepted Telephone Calls at the Virginia Beach Correctional Facility” (filed by the Commonwealth as a bound exhibit on July 7, 2008). (Note: The Commonwealth intends to redact the following phrases from that conversation on page 23:
JOSEPH KEREKES: Well, well why isn’t Harlow calling is he with Brice now?
RENEE MARTIN: Yea, yea, he’s with Brice now.
JOSEPH KEREKES: Well how do you know that?
RENEE MARTIN: Umm, because I talked to Jim Brice and he said he was going in to see Harlow, he’d call me back.)
The Commonwealth also intends to redact intercepted call #99 (also in the bound filing), an intercepted conversation between Joseph Kerekes and Renee Martin, as follows:
At page 37, Joseph Kerekes states, “... ya know and even the day of the supposed meeting when I thought that he would do business with this man, I said Harlow, do you really think we need to do this business with man, we have our own company, do we need to do this business with this man, anyways, this is all stuff Harlow will verify I sure, if it ever has to be.” The Commonwealth would seek to delete the italicized portion of Defendant Kerekes’ statement for trial (“I said Harlow” to the end of the statement would be deleted).
At page 38 of the same conversation, Defendant Kerekes states, “Umm, a very small bottle of liquid, that you might use at a picnic. Yes, you know... and umm, I said Harlow.” The Commonwealth would seek to delete the “I said Harlow” portion of the statement for trial. By removing those two references, that particular conversation would not identify Harlow, and the Commonwealth submits the conversation should be admissible at a joint trial.
Thereafter, in conversation #101 at pages 43-45: #101-103 at page 49; and #104 (all contained in the Commonwealth’s bound filing), Cuadra, responding to Kerekes, adopts Plan B as outlined above on page 2. The intercepted conversations from the Virginia Beach prison outlined above, and within the above-referenced Commonwealth filing, are adoptive admissions. Both Defendants are adopting ‘Plan B’ as a common scheme or design. The conversations are also evidence of the Defendants adopting the conspiracy. The Commonwealth submits that the statements are admissible against both parties and their use is not grounds for severance.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
JACQUELINE MUSTO CARROLL
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MICHAEL MELNICK
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ALLYSON KACMARSKI
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SHANNON CRAKE
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
JACQUELINE MUSTO CARROLL
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MICHAEL MELNICK
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ALLYSON KACMARSKI
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SHANNON CRAKE
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Monday, August 25, 2008
Judge's Order for Independant Psychiatric Evaluations
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2008, at 2:30 o’clock p.m., upon review and consideration of the Commonwealth’s Motion to Compel Independent Psychiatric Evaluations of Defendants Harlow Raymond Cuadra and Joseph Manuel Kerekes, as well as the brief in support of the same, and following argument and subsequent agreement by Counsel, it is ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Defense Counsel for each Defendant having advised the Commonwealth that both Defendant Cuadra and Defendant Kerekes will present evidence of mental infirmity in an effort to establish mitigating circumstances in any penalty phase proceeding should one be necessary, Defendant Cuadra and Defendant Kerekes shall submit to an Independent Psychiatric Evaluation including any necessary testing to be conducted by the Commonwealth’s expert. Said examination shall be scheduled on a date chosen by the Commonwealth.
2. Defense Counsel and/or a psychiatric expert engaged by the each Defendant shall have the right to be present for said evaluation, and shall have the right to orally record said evaluation.
3. The Commonwealth shall provide the Court with an expert report regarding each evaluation on or before December 1, 2008. Said reports shall be held under seal until the conclusion of the guilt phase of the within proceedings.
4. The Commonwealth’s expert shall not discuss his examination or the results thereof with anyone, including the Commonwealth, unless and until the results are released by the Court.
BY THE COURT:
OLSZEWSKI, JR.
Copies:
Assistant District Attorney Michael S. Melnick
Assistant District Attorney Timothy M. Doherty
Assistant District Attorney Shannon Crake
Assistant District Attorney William Dunn
John B. Pike, Esquire
Shelley L. Centini, Esquire
Stephen Menn, Esquire
Michael Senape, Esquire
1. Defense Counsel for each Defendant having advised the Commonwealth that both Defendant Cuadra and Defendant Kerekes will present evidence of mental infirmity in an effort to establish mitigating circumstances in any penalty phase proceeding should one be necessary, Defendant Cuadra and Defendant Kerekes shall submit to an Independent Psychiatric Evaluation including any necessary testing to be conducted by the Commonwealth’s expert. Said examination shall be scheduled on a date chosen by the Commonwealth.
2. Defense Counsel and/or a psychiatric expert engaged by the each Defendant shall have the right to be present for said evaluation, and shall have the right to orally record said evaluation.
3. The Commonwealth shall provide the Court with an expert report regarding each evaluation on or before December 1, 2008. Said reports shall be held under seal until the conclusion of the guilt phase of the within proceedings.
4. The Commonwealth’s expert shall not discuss his examination or the results thereof with anyone, including the Commonwealth, unless and until the results are released by the Court.
BY THE COURT:
OLSZEWSKI, JR.
Copies:
Assistant District Attorney Michael S. Melnick
Assistant District Attorney Timothy M. Doherty
Assistant District Attorney Shannon Crake
Assistant District Attorney William Dunn
John B. Pike, Esquire
Shelley L. Centini, Esquire
Stephen Menn, Esquire
Michael Senape, Esquire
PPO Expected to Rule this Week on Motions Related to Cuadra/Kerekes Trial
The Citizens' Voice asks... will accused killers Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes be tried together or separately for the murder of Bryan Kocis in Dallas Township in January 2007?
Can their history of working as male escorts and producers of gay pornographic films, referred to in court filings as, “alleged prior bad acts,” be used by prosecutors to undermine their character?
And will prosecutors be permitted to introduce a number of pieces of potentially incriminating evidence, including recordings and transcripts of conversations in which Cuadra and Kerekes told acquaintances intimate details about the murder?
Luzerne County Judge Peter Paul Olszewski Jr. could answer those questions and more this week, when he is expected to rule on more than a dozen of the pre-trial motions filed by attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes within the last four months.
Cuadra, 27, and Kerekes, 34, both of Virginia Beach, Va., are accused of killing Kocis, a rival producer of gay pornographic films, and later setting fire to his Midland Drive home.
They face the death penalty and are scheduled to be tried together beginning Jan. 5, following the postponement of an original Sept. 2 start date.
Attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes have argued the one-time lovers and business partners have developed an “adversarial” relationship, with conflicting defense strategies, and should be tried separately.
According to notices of possible alibi defense filed by both defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes could claim they were in Room 211 of the Fox Ridge Motel in Plains Township at the time Kocis was killed, 12 miles away.
However, Kerekes has stated in conversations with acquaintance Renee Martin that he was in the room alone while Cuadra visited Kocis.
“The jury will have no choice but to disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of one of the defendants in order to believe the testimony offered on behalf of the other defendant,” attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes said in a brief filed Aug. 6.
In addition to the request for separate trials, attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes have asked Olszewski to prohibit prosecutors from using statements Kerekes made to police immediately after his arrest in May 2007, conversations Cuadra and Kerekes had with Sean Lockhart and Grant Roy in San Diego in April 2007, e-mail messages Cuadra sent to Kocis in the days before the killing, and evidence seized from the home where Cuadra and Kerekes lived in Viriginia Beach that linked them to Kocis.
Kerekes testified at a pre-trial hearing last month that the police interview, conducted May 15, 2007, at the headquarters of the Viriginia Beach Police Department, should be suppressed because the investigators, Cpl. Leo Hannon of state police and Special Agent James J. Glenn of the FBI, violated his right to an attorney.
“They walked into the room and I said, ‘I want a lawyer,’” Kerekes said during brief testimony that was limited to the post-arrest police interview. “It was the first thing out of my mouth.”
The investigators continued to ask questions about Kerekes’ employment history, military history, personal relationships and other background, the attorneys said.
Kerekes began to cry during the interview and “swore on his mother’s life that he was not the one” who killed Kocis.
Kerekes volunteered information about a motive, and hinted at his possible involvement, as he denied knowledge of a telephone conversation between Cuadra and Lockhart on Jan. 25, the day after the killing.
According to prosecutors, Cuadra directed Lockhart to read about Kocis’ death on wnep.com, the Web site of WNEP-TV, and allegedly said, “I guess my guy went overboard.”
“Are you going to believe the words from the lips of that boy?” Kerekes said during the police interview, referring to Lockhart, who starred in gay pornographic films produced by Kocis. “It wasn’t about money. We have money.”
The attorneys questioned the validity of the San Diego conversations because of conflicts in California and Pennsylvania law governing the use of hidden recording devices by investigators and because Roy, who volunteered to wear such a device, had originally been identified as a suspect in Kocis’ death.
Kocis had, until days before his death, been locked in a lawsuit with Roy and Lockhart over Lockhart’s ability to work for other companies using his stage name, Brent Corrigan.
“It was quick. He never saw it coming,” Cuadra said, according to transcripts of the San Diego conversations.
“Actually seeing that (expletive) go down,” Cuadra said later in the transcript, allegedly referring to Kocis. “It’s actually sick, but it made me feel better inside.”
The e-mail messages, obtained by prosecutors through six search warrants from Jan. 30, 2007, to Aug. 27, 2007, show Cuadra established communication with Kocis on Jan. 22, two days before his death.
Cuadra wrote to Kocis posing as an inexperienced pornographic film actor named “Danny Moilin.” He created an e-mail address on Jan. 22, 2007, solely to contact Kocis, prosecutors said.
Prosecutors said Cuadra created the Moilin character as a ruse to gain a private meeting with Kocis, 46, who led a nearly reclusive life.
Cuadra sent Kocis photographs of himself, tying him to the Moilin character, and ordered an online background check of Kocis days before the murder, prosecutors said.
Cuadra also called Kocis on a cell phone purchased and used to call only Kocis, and rented a vehicle that was seen by witnesses in Kocis’ driveway around the time of the killing, prosecutors said.
Attorneys for Cuadra said the search warrants used to obtain the e-mail messages, from Yahoo, Excite and MySpace, were granted without sufficient probable cause.
Can their history of working as male escorts and producers of gay pornographic films, referred to in court filings as, “alleged prior bad acts,” be used by prosecutors to undermine their character?
And will prosecutors be permitted to introduce a number of pieces of potentially incriminating evidence, including recordings and transcripts of conversations in which Cuadra and Kerekes told acquaintances intimate details about the murder?
Luzerne County Judge Peter Paul Olszewski Jr. could answer those questions and more this week, when he is expected to rule on more than a dozen of the pre-trial motions filed by attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes within the last four months.
Cuadra, 27, and Kerekes, 34, both of Virginia Beach, Va., are accused of killing Kocis, a rival producer of gay pornographic films, and later setting fire to his Midland Drive home.
They face the death penalty and are scheduled to be tried together beginning Jan. 5, following the postponement of an original Sept. 2 start date.
Attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes have argued the one-time lovers and business partners have developed an “adversarial” relationship, with conflicting defense strategies, and should be tried separately.
According to notices of possible alibi defense filed by both defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes could claim they were in Room 211 of the Fox Ridge Motel in Plains Township at the time Kocis was killed, 12 miles away.
However, Kerekes has stated in conversations with acquaintance Renee Martin that he was in the room alone while Cuadra visited Kocis.
“The jury will have no choice but to disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of one of the defendants in order to believe the testimony offered on behalf of the other defendant,” attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes said in a brief filed Aug. 6.
In addition to the request for separate trials, attorneys for Cuadra and Kerekes have asked Olszewski to prohibit prosecutors from using statements Kerekes made to police immediately after his arrest in May 2007, conversations Cuadra and Kerekes had with Sean Lockhart and Grant Roy in San Diego in April 2007, e-mail messages Cuadra sent to Kocis in the days before the killing, and evidence seized from the home where Cuadra and Kerekes lived in Viriginia Beach that linked them to Kocis.
Kerekes testified at a pre-trial hearing last month that the police interview, conducted May 15, 2007, at the headquarters of the Viriginia Beach Police Department, should be suppressed because the investigators, Cpl. Leo Hannon of state police and Special Agent James J. Glenn of the FBI, violated his right to an attorney.
“They walked into the room and I said, ‘I want a lawyer,’” Kerekes said during brief testimony that was limited to the post-arrest police interview. “It was the first thing out of my mouth.”
The investigators continued to ask questions about Kerekes’ employment history, military history, personal relationships and other background, the attorneys said.
Kerekes began to cry during the interview and “swore on his mother’s life that he was not the one” who killed Kocis.
Kerekes volunteered information about a motive, and hinted at his possible involvement, as he denied knowledge of a telephone conversation between Cuadra and Lockhart on Jan. 25, the day after the killing.
According to prosecutors, Cuadra directed Lockhart to read about Kocis’ death on wnep.com, the Web site of WNEP-TV, and allegedly said, “I guess my guy went overboard.”
“Are you going to believe the words from the lips of that boy?” Kerekes said during the police interview, referring to Lockhart, who starred in gay pornographic films produced by Kocis. “It wasn’t about money. We have money.”
The attorneys questioned the validity of the San Diego conversations because of conflicts in California and Pennsylvania law governing the use of hidden recording devices by investigators and because Roy, who volunteered to wear such a device, had originally been identified as a suspect in Kocis’ death.
Kocis had, until days before his death, been locked in a lawsuit with Roy and Lockhart over Lockhart’s ability to work for other companies using his stage name, Brent Corrigan.
“It was quick. He never saw it coming,” Cuadra said, according to transcripts of the San Diego conversations.
“Actually seeing that (expletive) go down,” Cuadra said later in the transcript, allegedly referring to Kocis. “It’s actually sick, but it made me feel better inside.”
The e-mail messages, obtained by prosecutors through six search warrants from Jan. 30, 2007, to Aug. 27, 2007, show Cuadra established communication with Kocis on Jan. 22, two days before his death.
Cuadra wrote to Kocis posing as an inexperienced pornographic film actor named “Danny Moilin.” He created an e-mail address on Jan. 22, 2007, solely to contact Kocis, prosecutors said.
Prosecutors said Cuadra created the Moilin character as a ruse to gain a private meeting with Kocis, 46, who led a nearly reclusive life.
Cuadra sent Kocis photographs of himself, tying him to the Moilin character, and ordered an online background check of Kocis days before the murder, prosecutors said.
Cuadra also called Kocis on a cell phone purchased and used to call only Kocis, and rented a vehicle that was seen by witnesses in Kocis’ driveway around the time of the killing, prosecutors said.
Attorneys for Cuadra said the search warrants used to obtain the e-mail messages, from Yahoo, Excite and MySpace, were granted without sufficient probable cause.
Sunday, August 24, 2008
PPO Issues Trial Management Order
Judge Peter Paul Olzewski issued a trial management order on 08/14/2008 to Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes' defense counsel, as well as counsel for the Commonwealth:
AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2008, at 1:10 o’clock p.m.,it is ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:
1. PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
The Defendant and Counsel for both parties are hereby ATTACHED and shall attend a Pre-Trial Conference with the Court in Courtroom No. 2, Luzerne County Courthouse, 200 North River Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, which Pre-Trial Conference shall take place on Thursday, November 20, 2008 at 1:00 p.m.
2. DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVIDED TO COURT AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
Counsel for the Commonwealth and Defendant shall provide the Court with the following material at the Pre-Trial Conference:
A. An Exhibit List identifying and describing each item that may be offered into evidence.
B. A Witness List identifying all witnesses who will or might be called to testify at any stage of the proceeding. The identity shall include full name, address and if known, telephone number. If any individual is to be offered as an “expert” witness, counsel shall so identify the individual and, in addition to the aforesaid information, shall also identify the area of expertise.
C. A Trial Brief specifying all the factual and legal issues that might arise prior to or during the course of trial in this matter, together with a summary of all legal arguments on the cited issues, and appropriate citations of authority.
D. Proposed Voir Dire Questions to be asked to jurors regarding their qualifications on voir dire examination with an appropriate citation of authority to support any inquiry which is not routine.
E. Verdict Slip Counsel for both parties shall provide the Court with proposed Verdict Slips for both the Guilty Phase and potential Penalty Phase of the within Trial.
3. DISCOVERY TO BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH
Counsel for the Commonwealth shall be prepared to provide Defense Counsel with all of the following if it has not been done prior to the Pre-Trial Conference:
A. Any evidence favorable to the accused which is material to either guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the Attorney for the Commonwealth.
B. Copies of any and all statements with the substance of any oral statement or statements made by the Defendant, and, in addition, the identity of the person to whom the statement or statements were made.
C. The results or reports of any scientific tests conducted by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, and any reports received relating to the opinion of any expert whether said person is to be called as a witness or not.
D. An exhibit of all photographs and other tangible objects or evidence that may conveniently be exhibited at the Pre-Trial Conference.
E. The names and addresses of any and all eyewitnesses to the offense.
F. Copies of all written or recorded statements and substantially verbatim oral statements of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial.
4. DISCOVERY TO BE PROVIDED BY THE DEFENDANT
The Defendant, subject to his rights against compulsory self incrimination, shall be prepared to provide the Attorney for the Commonwealth with the results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession and control of the Defendant, which the Defendant intends to offer as evidence-in-chief, or which were prepared by a witness whom the Defendant intends to call at trial.
5. ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
Counsel for the Commonwealth and the Defendant shall be prepared to address themselves at the Pre-Trial Conference to the following questions or issues:
A. Disposition of any and all pending Pro-Trial Motions presented in timely compliance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
B. Jury sequestration during voir dire examination and/or trial.
C. The number of preemptory challenges applicable to this trial.
D. The simplification of factual issues, including admissibility of evidence.
E. The time schedule of the trial which shall commence on Monday, January 5, 2009.
F. The qualification of Exhibits as evidence to avoid unnecessary delay.
G. Any particular or special problems involving the attendance of the witnesses. (NOTE: Counsel for the Commonwealth and the Defendant shall ensure that no such problems arise.)
H. Any and all objections, proffers and Motions in Limine which are capable of presentation and determination before trial.
---
Note from PC: I know this is a little late, and I've got several other documents to post as well. I broke a finger on my left hand the other day (I also happen to be left handed), but things should begin to return to near-normal thanks to meds. :)
TRIAL MANAGEMENT ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of August, 2008, at 1:10 o’clock p.m.,it is ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:
1. PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
The Defendant and Counsel for both parties are hereby ATTACHED and shall attend a Pre-Trial Conference with the Court in Courtroom No. 2, Luzerne County Courthouse, 200 North River Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, which Pre-Trial Conference shall take place on Thursday, November 20, 2008 at 1:00 p.m.
2. DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVIDED TO COURT AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
Counsel for the Commonwealth and Defendant shall provide the Court with the following material at the Pre-Trial Conference:
A. An Exhibit List identifying and describing each item that may be offered into evidence.
B. A Witness List identifying all witnesses who will or might be called to testify at any stage of the proceeding. The identity shall include full name, address and if known, telephone number. If any individual is to be offered as an “expert” witness, counsel shall so identify the individual and, in addition to the aforesaid information, shall also identify the area of expertise.
C. A Trial Brief specifying all the factual and legal issues that might arise prior to or during the course of trial in this matter, together with a summary of all legal arguments on the cited issues, and appropriate citations of authority.
D. Proposed Voir Dire Questions to be asked to jurors regarding their qualifications on voir dire examination with an appropriate citation of authority to support any inquiry which is not routine.
E. Verdict Slip Counsel for both parties shall provide the Court with proposed Verdict Slips for both the Guilty Phase and potential Penalty Phase of the within Trial.
3. DISCOVERY TO BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH
Counsel for the Commonwealth shall be prepared to provide Defense Counsel with all of the following if it has not been done prior to the Pre-Trial Conference:
A. Any evidence favorable to the accused which is material to either guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the Attorney for the Commonwealth.
B. Copies of any and all statements with the substance of any oral statement or statements made by the Defendant, and, in addition, the identity of the person to whom the statement or statements were made.
C. The results or reports of any scientific tests conducted by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, and any reports received relating to the opinion of any expert whether said person is to be called as a witness or not.
D. An exhibit of all photographs and other tangible objects or evidence that may conveniently be exhibited at the Pre-Trial Conference.
E. The names and addresses of any and all eyewitnesses to the offense.
F. Copies of all written or recorded statements and substantially verbatim oral statements of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial.
4. DISCOVERY TO BE PROVIDED BY THE DEFENDANT
The Defendant, subject to his rights against compulsory self incrimination, shall be prepared to provide the Attorney for the Commonwealth with the results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession and control of the Defendant, which the Defendant intends to offer as evidence-in-chief, or which were prepared by a witness whom the Defendant intends to call at trial.
5. ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
Counsel for the Commonwealth and the Defendant shall be prepared to address themselves at the Pre-Trial Conference to the following questions or issues:
A. Disposition of any and all pending Pro-Trial Motions presented in timely compliance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
B. Jury sequestration during voir dire examination and/or trial.
C. The number of preemptory challenges applicable to this trial.
D. The simplification of factual issues, including admissibility of evidence.
E. The time schedule of the trial which shall commence on Monday, January 5, 2009.
F. The qualification of Exhibits as evidence to avoid unnecessary delay.
G. Any particular or special problems involving the attendance of the witnesses. (NOTE: Counsel for the Commonwealth and the Defendant shall ensure that no such problems arise.)
H. Any and all objections, proffers and Motions in Limine which are capable of presentation and determination before trial.
---
Note from PC: I know this is a little late, and I've got several other documents to post as well. I broke a finger on my left hand the other day (I also happen to be left handed), but things should begin to return to near-normal thanks to meds. :)
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
An Interesting Twist of Fate?
After attorneys for Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes argued their preparation had been hampered by the dismissal of two colleagues last month... Judge Peter Paul Olszewski Jr. reluctantly postponed the trial until January 5, 2009.
Here's the interesting/odd thing... back on April 17, 2008... Assistant District Attorney Mike Melnick said that he expects his case to last about two weeks. Defense attorneys for both suspects said they expect their cases to last two to three days.
Without knowing how long it's going to take a jury to reach a decision... wouldn't it be just a little ironic if it's done around January 24th*, the second-year anniversary of the brutal slaying of Bryan Kocis?
It's certainly possible... and a little eerie.
* Note: 01/24/09 is on a Saturday, so a jury ruling is not likely to happen on the exact same date.
Here's the interesting/odd thing... back on April 17, 2008... Assistant District Attorney Mike Melnick said that he expects his case to last about two weeks. Defense attorneys for both suspects said they expect their cases to last two to three days.
Without knowing how long it's going to take a jury to reach a decision... wouldn't it be just a little ironic if it's done around January 24th*, the second-year anniversary of the brutal slaying of Bryan Kocis?
It's certainly possible... and a little eerie.
* Note: 01/24/09 is on a Saturday, so a jury ruling is not likely to happen on the exact same date.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)