Tuesday, August 12, 2008

A Couple of Docket Updates

Over the past week there's been a few updates on Harlow Cuadra and Joseph Kerekes' court dockets. I guess the most interesting one is a filing of 17 certifications of subpoenas for out of state witnesses.

08/07/2008 (17) Certification of Subpoenas Out of State filed. Luzerne County District Attorney's Office

08/08/2008 (2) Supoena Certifications filed by DA's Office Luzerne County District Attorney's Office

08/08/2008 Certificate of Judge requesting State for Attendance of Out of State Witness filed. Olszewski, Peter Paul Jr.

08/08/2008 Comm's request for Attendance of Out of State Witness filed. Luzerne County District Attorney's Office

08/12/2008 Certificate of Clerk for Attendance of Out of State Witness filed to Robert Reilly-Clerk of Courts Luzerne County District Attorney's Office

08/12/2008 Certificate of Clerk for Attendance of Out of State Witness to Tom Pizan-Deputy Clerk of Courts Luzerne County District Attorney's Office

08/12/2008 Certification from DA's Office filed. Olszewski, Peter Paul Jr.

I'm hoping to get a copy of the filings later today, and will update this post with a list of who these 17 witnesses are. Also, we should be hearing from PPO sometime this week (possibly today) in regards to answers to some, if not all of the motions that have been filed.

Monday, August 11, 2008

DA's Brief in Response to Defendants Motion to Suppress Evidence

COMMONWEALTH'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS CUADRA AND KEREKES' MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO SEARCH WARRANTS/EVIDENCE SIEZED FROM THE DEFENDANTS' E-MAIL ACCOUNTS


I. Statement of Relevant Facts
II. Issues: A
III. Issues: B
IV. Issues: C
V. Issues: D

Statement of Relevant Facts

I. Statement of Relevant Facts

On February 10, 2007, the Virginia Beach Police Department executed a search warrant on 1028 Stratem Court, Virginia Beach, Virginia. The warrant had been sworn out before a Judge from of the Virginia Beach Circuit Court, the equivalent of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Detective Sean Coerse of the Homicide Division, Virginia Beach Police Department had applied and sworn out this search warrant.

The search warrant states the offense committed was murder, and gives a specific description of 1028 Stratem Court, Virginia Beach, Virginia, the Defendants’ residence as the home to be searched. A detailed description of items to be searched for included recording devices, digital cameras, various types of computer equipment (modems, fixed discs, external hard drives etc), software, documents, etc. The warrant requests the ability to search for information stored within a computer system or storage media. See Rosa v. Commonwealth 48 Va. App. 93, 628 S.E.2d 92 (2006), relying upon the Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Copenhefer 526 Pa. 555, 587 A.2d 1353, (1991).

On January 30, 2007, a federal search warrant was served on Yahoo for the dmbottompa@yahoo.com email account which was the account used to contact the victim Bryan Kocis and make arrangements for the January 24, 2007 meeting with the victim.

On February 6, 2007, a federal search warrant was served upon IAC Search and Media for the email account of harlowrcuadra@excite.com. This email account was accessed from the same IP addresses during the same time period as the dmbottompa@yahoo.com account.

On March 14, 2007, three respective federal search warrants were served: one on the MySpace account of Harlow Cuadra and one on the MySpace account of Joseph Kerekes. A federal search warrant was served upon stareyes235l0@yahoo.com which Defendant Kerekes is the registered user. These accounts were all accessed from the same IP addresses during the same time period as the dmbottompa@yahoo.com account. The federal search warrants were each supported by lengthy affidavits of probable cause.

On August 27, 2007 District Justice James Tupper, on August 27, 2007, approved and issued a search warrant for any and all information related to the Yahoo Account party757@yahoo.com. This email account was accessed from the same IP addresses during the same time period as the dmbottompa@yahoo.com account. This search warrant was supported by a twenty — two (22) page affidavit of probable cause.

On July 28, 2008, Attorney Michael Senape served a ‘Joint Reply Brief to Commonwealth’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress Search Warrants and Evidence Seized from E-Mail Accounts’ on behalf of both Defendants. Defense counsel for both Defendants has filed multiple ‘joint’ briefs in recent weeks that, the Commonwealth asserts, indicates that their defenses are consistent, compatible and coordinated. In this brief, the defense argues that should the items seized pursuant to the February 10, 2007 search warrant executed on the Defendants’ 1028 Stratem Court, Virginia Beach, Virginia residence be suppressed, the use of any informationlevidence gained from that alleged illegal seizure to form the basis of Affidavits of Probable Cause for Defendants’ e-mail accounts would result in invalid search warrants, thereby requiring suppression of evidence obtained from the Defendants’ e-mail accounts.

The Commonwealth respectfully disagrees with defense counsel’s position as set forth below. The Commonwealth submits that evidence seized as a result of the Virginia Beach search warrant should not be suppressed, therefore, any reference to such items in affidavits for search warrants for email accounts is not fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if the Court were to suppress the computers/evidence seized from the Defendant’s residence, the Affidavits contain sufficient probable cause without reference to the seized items. Even if the search warrants did not contain sufficient probable cause, which the Commonwealth submits that they do, the ‘good faith’ exception would govern thereby allowing admission of the evidence obtained pursuant to those warrants. Beyond that, the Commonwealth would have discovered and/or been able to lawfully obtain the information in the email accounts in question from other sources than the computers seized from the Defendants’ residence.

Issues: A

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Issues: B

III. Issues: B. THE PENNSYLVANIA SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANTS’ PARTY757@YAHOO.COM EMAIL ACCOUNT IS VALID.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 206 specifically outlines the requirements for a search warrant;

(a) the name and department, agency or address of the affiant.

(b) Identify specifically the items or property to be searched for and seized;

(c) The name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched;

(d) Identify the owner, occupant, or possessor or the place to be searched;

(e) Specify or describe the crime which has been or is being committed,

(f) Setting forth the facts and circumstances which for the basis for the affiant’s conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the items or property identified are evidence or the fruit of a crime, or are contraband or are expected to be otherwise unlawfully possesses or are subject to seizure, and that these items or property are or are expected to be located on the particular person or at the particular place described.

As mandated by the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, the standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists for a search warrant to be issued is the totality of the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Smith 784 A.2d 182, 187 (Pa. Super. 2001), Commonwealth v. Bartee 868 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super 2005) and Commonwealth v. Gray 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1995). The issuing authority must make a common — sense decision whether, pursuant to the totality of the circumstances presented, there is a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity will be found in a particular place to be searched. Commonwealth v. Smith 784 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. 2001). As always, due deference is given to the issuing magistrate. Commonwealth v. Rompilla 653 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. 1995).

Applying the “Totality of the Circumstances Test”, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for...[concluding] "that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).

Under Pennsylvania case law the above decision must be based on the facts described within the four corners of the supporting affidavit. Commonwealth v. Smith 784 A.2d 182, 184 (Pa. Super. Ct, 2001). Under Gates the traditional test of the “veracity” and “basis of Knowledge” set out in Spinelli v. United States 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aquilar v. Texas 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was abandoned in favor of including those factors with any other factors and analyzing the affidavit under the “totality of the circumstances” to determine if probable cause exists to issue a search warrant.

In Pennsylvania, probable cause to issue a search warrant test is as follows: two factors are used generally when determining if a search warrant should be issued: (1) the items sought are connected with criminal activity and (2) the items will be found in the place to be searched. Commonwealth v. Gray 469 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).

Where information is gleaned from an informant, the reliability of an informant as probable cause, A magistrate must consider four factors in determining the credibility of an unidentified informant and the reliability of his information: (1) Did the informant give reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by another source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip? Commonwealth v. Gray 469 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). The affidavit of probable cause does not have to satisfy all four factors. Id. Information provided by an informant establishes probable cause if there is a probability of criminal activity, a prima facie showing of criminal activity is not required. Commonwealth v. Luton 672 A.2d 819, 822 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). When information essential to a finding of probable cause is garnered from a confidential informant the authority issuing a search warrant determines the reliability of the informant’s information from the facts supplied by the police official. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger 706 A.2d 1216, 1225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).

Although information provided by informants that is contained in an affidavit is hearsay, it may be a sufficient basis to establish probable cause for the purposes of issuing a search warrant. The issuing authority will look within the “four corners” of the affidavit for four factors when determining whether or not an informant is a reliable source and whether or not the affidavit supports a finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant.

Even if the computer forensic examination conducted upon the computers seized from the Defendants’ residence was suppressed, there is still sufficient probable cause in the affidavit for the search warrant for the Defendants’ party757@yahoo.com email account as described at length in the above statement of facts section. The August 27, 2007 affidavit of probable cause for the search warrant for the party757 email account is an involved 22 pages, only a small part of which includes reference to the computer forensic examination on evidence seized from the Defendants’ residence; investigators acted in good faith in relying upon that warrant. Even if the evidence received from the party757@yahoo.com search warrant was suppressed (based on an alleged illegal seizure of computers from the Defendants’ residence), which the Commonwealth submits should not be suppressed, investigators would have ultimately been provided information regarding that account, including all emails exchanged between party757@yahoo.com and Matthew Brannon, from Matthew Brannon who has been interviewed by investigators.

Issues: C

IV. Issues: C. Pennsylvania Authorities Acted in Good Faith in Relying upon Search Warrant

The Good Faith Exception to the exclusionary rule will apply and evidence will not be uppressed where it is shown that authorities reasonably relied in good faith upon a search warrant. The defense correctly sets forth the controlling analysis for the good faith exception where evidence will only be excluded where an officer’s reliance on a warrant is not reasonable. The unreasonable reliance situations are: (1) when the magistrate judge issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2) when the magistrate judge abandoned his judicial role and failed to perform his neutral and detached function; (3) when the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed to particularized the place to be searched or the things to be seized. U.S. v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents 307 F.3d 137 (3d. Cir.1999).

The Commonwealth submits that Magistrate Tupper’s issuance of/Pennsylvania authorities’ reliance upon the search warrant for the party757 email account was reasonable based upon the arguments set forth in the statement of facts section above, therefore, even if the warrant was deemed to be invalid, the good faith exception would apply and the evidence is admissible.

Issues: D

V. Issues: D. Pennsylvania Authorities were able to obtain the relevant Party757@yahoo.com evidence from indetendent sources and the discovery of the email account was inevitable.

“The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawfiil search, and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search Murray v. United States 487 U.S. 533 (1988)(citing Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Silverman v. United States 365 U.S. 505 (1961)). “Beyond that, the exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Id. at 537 (citing Nardone v. United States 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Wong Sun v. United States 371 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1963).

“The interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.” Id. citing Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). “The independent source doctrine applies also to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others.” Id. citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

“Information which is received through an illegal source is considered to be cleanly obtained when it arrives through an independent source.” Id. at 538 citing United States v. Silvestri 787 F. 2d 736, 739 (1986). “The independent source doctrine does not rest upon a metaphysical analysis, but upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. So long as a later, lawflul seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one, which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession, there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” Id. at 541.

“In addition, the inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered though an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.” Id. at 539.

The Commonwealth submits that, based on testimony, oral argument and the arguments contained in prior submissions that the evidence seized pursuant to the Virginia Beach warrant on the Defendants’ residence should not be suppressed. Even if the evidence seized were to be suppressed, the affidavits of probable cause for the respective email accounts in question still contained sufficient probable cause to obtain the sought after email account information. Even if the Court were to decide that the affidavits did not contain sufficient probable cause, the Commonwealth submits that the good faith exception would apply, thereby justifying the Magistrates’ issuance of and Pennsylvania authorities’ reliance upon the search warrants. Even if the Court were to decide that the warrants for the Virginia Beach residence and the email accounts in question were faulty and the 'good faith’ exception did not apply to any of the warrants, the Commonwealth submits that it still obtained the same information from independent sources and the emails in question would have been/were inevitably discovered by the Commonwealth; various recipients of emails sent from the email accounts in dispute, for example, Grant Roy, Sean Lockhart, Matthew Brannon and David Michaels were/are in lawful possession of the same email information the Commonwealth seeks to introduce and the Defendants are seeking to suppress.

Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth respectfully requests that the Defendants’ joint motion to suppress information pursuant to search warrants for certain email accounts be denied and dismissed.

Saturday, August 9, 2008

So Who Did It?

"Approx “seven years ago”, KEREKES enlisted into the Marine Corps through a local recruiting station. KEREKES stated that his military attendance was for a duration of three days at Paris Island, North Carolina, KEREKES added; I wasn’t cut out for it. They classified me as “unfit for duty”. "

3 days at Marine Corps boot camp certainly doesn't qualify you as being a Marine, and Joe certainly wouldn't have had any kind of combat training during that short visit.

"Furthermore, Chief Vivian testified that when he went into the house with the State Police Fire Marshall, they found two smoke detectors which were removed from their mounts, the first floor smoke detector was placed on a table near the wall and the upstairs smoke detector was lying on the bathroom floor off the main hallway. "

Someone that takes the time to place a smoke detector on a table, certainly doesn't seem like a person that's in any great hurry. One would think that if you where, you'd rip the things down, and not care where they landed.

"Amy Zamerowski recalls that she turned onto Midland Drive at precisely 8:26 p.m. When she pulled into the Withers’ driveway, there was a light colored SUV backing out of the Kocis driveway. "

...and...

"In reviewing the records for Kerekes’ multiple cell phones, it was determined that one cell phone registered to Kerekes placed a call to another cell phone registered to Kerekes at 8:34 p.m. January 24, 2007. The signal from this call bounced off a cell tower located at Country Club Road, Dallas, Pennsylvania which can be seen from the Kocis residence. "

That's an eight minute difference in time... yet the call was placed from the same area... and then we have:

"Chief Vivian, of the Dallas Township Fire Dept states the fire was called in at 8:35 p.m."

So many interesting quotes... I'll add more to this post shortly, but here's my theory thus far... and again I say it's only a theory. This should in no way be construed as fact:

Both Harlow and Joe went to Bryan's house that night... Harlow met with Bryan while Joe waited in the SUV, sending emails through his wireless Internet in the hopes of creating an alibi.

Harlow slips a drug in Bryan's drink... slits Bryan's throat figuring that it would take care of things (remember, he was an alleged Navy corpsman)... then lets Joe in. There are no defensive wounds found... so this would tell me that the slice was not done by some 'dude' that 'just came around'.

After nearly decapitating him... Bryan's body is still moving, so Harlow and Joe panic figuring he's not dead, and then proceed to stab him 28 times to ensure the deed is done, or when any motion finally stops.

Harlow and Joe then proceed to take all of the items they knew they wanted... computer towers, 2257's, etc... the Rolex was an extra 'gift' - which I think they pawned as alleged by Joe in the CCT's.

I also think the knife bought at the Wilkes-Barre Walmart was done as a ruse... they either used the knife purchased in Virginia Beach to commit the crime, and used the Walmart knife as 'left-behind' evidence, or they bought the knife in VB, figuring the PA police would never know that they purchased another in Wilkes-Barre. Either-way, I think the DA has the murder weapon.

Meanwhile... what are your thoughts of how the murder took place?

... I'll share more of mine tomorrow.