Saturday, January 31, 2009

The Witness Round-Up... Again.

Over the past week or so, the DA's office has filed subpoenas for a total of 26 witnesses to attend Harlow Cuadra's upcoming February trial:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is scheduled to commence criminal prosecution of Harlow Cuadra at trial commencing on February 17, 2009 in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, 200 N. River Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18711. [Witness Name] is a material witnesses for the Commonwealth and the attendance at the aforesaid trial is necessary from February 17, 2009 through March 20, 2009. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requests that in the event that the witness is uncooperative, that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to ensure his/her inclusive attendance at the Pennsylvania trial proceedings as per Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 522 and all relevant comments thereto and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. section 5964 relating to witnesses from another state summoned to testify in this Commonwealth. The Commonwealth certifies the compulory attendance of this witness is not for the purpose of serving said witness with process from another civil or criminal proceeding. The Commonwealth hereby waives its right to serve said witness with process, civil or criminal, by virtue of the witness' attendance/presence in Pennsylvania in this matter.

(in no particular order)

Christopher Dewolfe (Custodian of Records MYSPACE)
Chris Hurd (Custodian of Records DVINFO.net)
Matthew Brannon (Material Witness)
Michael Rozyla (Custodian of Records Verizon Wireless)
Annie Cappeller (Custodian of Records IAC Search & Media)
Heather Blewett (Custodian of Records Sprint/Nextel)
Angela Evans (Custodian of Records All Tell)
David Mitchell aka David Michaels (Material Witness)
Michelle Mar (Custodian of Records USA People Search)
Jeffrey Stanford (Custodian of Records YAHOO!)
Justin Hensley (Material Witness)
Brendan Sheovic (VB Corr. Facility - Material Witness)
CPT Cassandra Lee (VB Corr. Facility - Material witness)
Matthew Bedois (Custodian of Records Enterprise Rental Car)
Lance Treadway (Material Witness)
Andrew Shunk (Material Witness)
Debra Crain (Superior Pawn Shop)
Ryan Dunbar (Superior Pawn Shop)
Irving Walker (Superior Pawn Shop)
Joseph J. Zalusky (Material Witness)
Nep Malaki (Material Witness)
Thomas Lampman (Material Witness)
Adam Greiber (Material Witness)
Christina Gist (Custodian of Records Doubletree Hotel)
Kimberly Hensley (Material Witness)
Harry Strait (Material Witness)

Friday, January 30, 2009

Muroski Elected President Judge

The Times Leader is reporting that Luzerne County Judge Chester Muroski has been elected president judge of Luzerne County by a 7-1 vote.

Thursday, January 29, 2009

John Roecker's Interview with Harlow has been Removed

The transcription of the interview that John Roecker did with Harlow Cuadra for the special that aired on Here!, in which I posted on this blog last month has been removed. Regent Media filed a DMCA complaint with Google earlier today:

Blogger has been notified, according to the terms of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), that certain content in your blog infringes upon the copyrights of others. The URL(s) of the allegedly infringing post(s) may be found at the end of this message.

The notice that we received from Regent Media, with any personally identifying information removed, will be posted online by a service called Chilling Effects at http://www.chillingeffects.org. We do this in accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Please note that it may take Chilling Effects up to several weeks to post the notice online at the link provided.

The DMCA is a United States copyright law that provides guidelines for online service provider liability in case of copyright infringement. We are in the process of removing from our servers the links that allegedly infringe upon the copyrights of others. If we did not do so, we would be subject to a claim of copyright infringement, regardless of its merits. See http://www.educause.edu/Browse/645?PARENT_ID=254 for more information about the DMCA, and see http://www.google.com/dmca.html for the process that Blogger requires in order to make a DMCA complaint.

Blogger can reinstate these posts upon receipt of a counter notification pursuant to sections 512(g)(2) and 3) of the DMCA. For more information about the requirements of a counter notification and a link to a sample counter notification, see http://www.google.com/dmca.html#counter.

Please note that repeated violations to our Terms of Service may result in further remedial action taken against your Blogger account. If you have legal questions about this notification, you should retain your own legal counsel. If you have any other questions about this notification, please let us know.

Sincerely,

The Blogger Team

Affected URLs:

http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/john-roeckers-interview-with-harlow.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-growing-up.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-harlow-comes-out-to.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-meeting-joe.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-arrest.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-escorting.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-making-porn.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-business-proposition.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-two-weeks-later.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-swat-raid.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-interrogation.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-being-in-jail.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-regrets.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-jailhouse-rants.html
http://handjtrial.blogspot.com/2008/12/harlows-interview-end.html
----

It was certainly not my intent to violate copyright laws (in which I'm well versed), but rather give everyone an opportunity to read what was said, but in hindsight, it was wrong to do so.

My apologies to Regent Media, and my readers.

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

More Bills for Joe

The Times Leader reports that a Luzerne County judge signed court papers Tuesday ordering Joseph Kerekes to pay $200 for mitigation services provided by a Brooklyn, N.Y., firm.

Kerekes, 34, was sentenced on Dec. 8 to life in prison after he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in the killing of Bryan Kocis, 44, in January 2007.

Kocis was found dead inside his burning home on Midland Road, Dallas Township. An autopsy determined Kocis was stabbed more than 30 times, arrest records indicated.

Investigators alleged Kerekes and Harlow Cuadra, 27, both of Virginia Beach, Va., killed Kocis, whom they considered a rival in the gay pornographic movie industry.

Cuadra is awaiting a Feb. 17 trial on homicide charges.

Kerekes’ attorney, John Pike, asked that $200 be paid to Lang & Kaboski, Forensic Social Work Services, LLP, which provided mitigation services to Kerekes in November and December.

Court papers say the firm performed work that included phone calls to Kerekes’ family members and attorneys, as well as reviewing file and prison records.

Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Peter Paul Olszewski signed the order allowing payment.
----

Note from PC: Just wanted to correct a few details in this Times Leader report... Kerekes is 35, and Bryan Kocis was stabbed 28 times.

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

President Judge PPO?

The Citizens' Voice reported this morning that "Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas judges will meet at noon Friday to vote for a successor for president judge, according to a news release from Judge Chester B. Muroski.

Muroski took over as acting president judge on Monday as former President Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. stepped down from that post."


With all of the events that unfolded yesterday... it got me thinking about who the next president judge would be... could it be Judge Peter Paul Olszewski, Jr., and if he is selected, would it effect Harlow's trial date?

After speaking with a source familiar with the situation, I'm told that they (the source) already have him penciled in as the next president judge. The others (judges) are either on the verge of mandatory retirement, not as experienced, or already served as PJ. Plus, PPO's well respected and a hard worker.

My source goes on to say that if PPO is selected, it won't have any impact on Harlow Cuadra's trial at all. He'd assume some additional administrative duties, but nothing that would prevent him from altering a trial already scheduled for next month.

Guess we'll see on Friday. :)

Update 01/29/2009: The Times Leader is reporting that for the first time in the history of Luzerne County court, the election of the new president judge will be open to the public, acting president Judge Chester Muroski announced today.

Mursoki said the vote, scheduled for Friday at noon, must be taken by secret ballot as required by law. The results of the vote will immediately be read in open court, however. The new president judge will then be immediately sworn in.

The judges will meet in courtroom number four at the Luzerne County Courthouse on North River St., Wilkes-Barre.

Monday, January 26, 2009

And in Other News...

The Citizens' Voice reports that Luzerne County judges Mark A. Ciavarella and Michael Conahan were charged today with two counts of conspiracy to impede the Internal Revenue Service in collecting federal income taxes and a scheme to defraud the citizens of Luzerne County and Pennsylvania of the right to their honest services.

Ciavarella and Conahan were charged with concealing the receipt of $2.6 million between January 2003 and April 2007. They have filed a plea agreement, signed by both judges, and pleaded guilty to honest service fraud and income tax conspiracy.

The judges stipulated they will resign their judgeship and be disbarred. They will serve 87 months in federal prison and make restitution as stipulated by the court.

Update: Press Release from U.S. Attorney General on Luzerne judges, and Information on Charges... and Ciavarella's Resignation Letter.

Update 2: Ciavarella's plea agreement ... Conahan's plea agreement.

Update 3: According to the Citizen's Voice: The information filed today alleges the judges received payments from two persons, identified as Individual # 1 and Individual # 2. They are not named, but the information says Individual # 1 was a Luzerne County attorney who was an owner of the Pennsylvania Child Care juvenile detention center that is at the core of the government’s case. Butler Township attorney Robert J. Powell was until June one of two co-owners of Pennsylvania Child Care. The other owner, Gregory Zappala, who is now sole owner of the firm, is a Pittsburgh-area investment banker.

The information says Individual #2 was the contractor that built Pennsylvania Child Care’s local facilty and another in Butler County. The contractor for both projects was Mericle Construction Inc., headed by local developer Robert Mericle.

Neither Powell nor Mericle responded immediately to requests for comment.

Update 4: Ciavarella releases a statement.

Update 5: State Supreme Court removes Conahan, Ciavarella from the bench.

Sunday, January 25, 2009

Harlow Cuadra's Trial... Step 2

Harlow Cuadra

Harlow Cuadra's trial is still scheduled to begin on February 17, 2009, for the brutal slaying of Bryan Kocis. Earlier this month, I did a post that went over the steps that will be taken before... and during... jury selection for Harlow's trial.

The following is a list of rules that take place once the jury has been selected:

Conduct of Jury Trial:

I. Swearing the Trial Jury to Hear the Cause
II. Consent to Be Tried by Less Than Twelve Jurors
III. Sequestration of Trial Jurors
IV. View by Jury
V. Note Taking by Jurors
VI. Seating and Discharge of Alternate Jurors
VII. Material Permitted in Possession of the Jury
VIII. Request for Instructions, Charge to the Jury, and Preliminary Instructions
IX. Verdicts
X. Sealed Verdict

Source: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Code

Swearing the Trial Jury to Hear the Cause

Rule 640. Swearing the Trial Jury to Hear the Cause

(A) After all jurors have been selected, the jury, including any alternates, shall be sworn as a body to hear the cause.

(B) The following oath shall be administered:

‘‘You do solemnly swear by Almighty God and those of you who affirm do declare and affirm that you will well and truly try the issue joined between the Commonwealth and the defendant(s), and a true verdict render according to the evidence.’’

Consent to Be Tried by Less Than Twelve Jurors

Rule 641. Agreement to be Tried by Fewer Than Twelve Jurors.

In all cases, at any time after a jury of 12 is initially sworn and before verdict, the defendant and the attorney for the Commonwealth, with approval of the judge, may agree to a jury of fewer than 12 but not fewer than 6. Such agreement shall be made a part of the record. The verdict in such a case shall have the same force and effect as a verdict by a jury of 12.

Sequestration of Trial Jurors

Rule 642. Sequestration of Trial Jurors.

(A) The trial judge may, in the judge’s discretion, order sequestration of trial jurors in the interests of justice.

(B) When sequestration is ordered, each juror, including any alternate, shall be sequestered from the time of acceptance as a juror until discharged.

(C) Nothing is paragraph (B) shall prevent a trial judge from ordering sequestration, or vacating the order of sequestration, at any time during a trial when the interests of justice require.

View by Jury

Rule 643. View by Jury.

(A) The trial judge may in the judge’s discretion order a view by the jury.

(B) The trial judge, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant and defendant’s attorney shall be present at the view, except as provided in Rule 602.

Note Taking by Jurors

Rule 644. Note Taking by Jurors.

(A) When a jury trial is expected to last for more than two days, jurors shall be permitted to take notes during the trial for their use during deliberations. When the trial is expected to last two days or less, the judge may permit the jurors to take notes.

(1) The jurors shall not take notes during the judge’s charge at the conclusion of the trial.

(2) The court shall provide materials to the jurors that are suitable for note taking. These are the only materials that may be used by the jurors for note taking.

(3) The court, the attorney for the Commonwealth, and the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, shall not request or suggest that jurors take notes, comment on the jurors’ note taking, or attempt to read any notes.

(4) The notes of the jurors shall remain in the custody of the court at all times.

(5) The jurors may have access to their notes and use their notes only during the trial and deliberations. The notes shall be collected or maintained by the court at each break and recess, and at the end of each day of the trial.

(6) The notes of the jurors shall be confidential and limited to use for the jurors’ deliberations.

(7) Before announcing the verdict, the jury shall return their notes to the court. The notes shall be destroyed by court personnel without inspection upon the discharge of the jury.

(8) The notes shall not be used as a basis for a request for a new trial, and the judge shall deny any request that the jurors’ notes be retained and sealed pending a request for a new trial.

(B) The judge shall instruct the jurors about taking notes during the trial. At a minimum, the judge shall instruct the jurors that:

(1) the jurors are not required to take notes, and those jurors who take notes are not required to take extensive notes;

(2) note taking should not divert jurors from paying full attention to the evidence and evaluating witness credibility;

(3) the notes merely are memory aids, not evidence or the official record;

(4) the jurors who take few or no notes should not permit their independent recollection of the evidence to be influenced by the fact that other jurors have taken notes;

(5) the jurors may not show their notes or disclose the contents of the notes to other jurors until deliberations begin, but may show the notes or disclose the contents during deliberations;

(6) the jurors may not take their notes out of the courtroom except to use their notes during deliberations; and

(7) the jurors’ notes are confidential, will not be reviewed by the court or anyone else, will be collected before the verdict is announced, and will be destroyed immediately upon discharge of the jury.

Seating and Discharge of Alternate Jurors

Rule 645. Seating and Discharge of Alternate Jurors.

(A) Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace principal jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.

(B) An alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged before the jury retires to consider its verdict.

Material Permitted in Possession of the Jury

Rule 646. Material Permitted in Possession of the Jury.

(A) Upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper, except as provided in paragraph (B).

(B) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:

(1) a transcript of any trial testimony;

(2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession by the defendant;

(3) a copy of the information;

(4) written jury instructions.

(C) The jurors shall be permitted to have their notes for use during deliberations.

Request for Instructions, Charge to the Jury, and Preliminary Instructions

Rule 647. Request for Instruction, Charge to the Jury, and Preliminary Instructions.

(A) Any party may submit to the trial judge written requests for instructions to the jury. Such requests shall be submitted within a reasonable time before the closing arguments, and at the same time copies thereof shall be furnished to the other parties. Before closing arguments, the trial judge shall inform the parties on the record of the judge’s rulings on all written requests. The trial judge shall charge the jury after the arguments are completed.

(B) No portions of the charge nor omissions therefrom may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate. All such objections shall be made beyond the hearing of the jury.

(C) After the jury has retired to consider its verdict, additional or correctional instructions may be given by the trial judge in the presence of all parties, except that the defendant’s absence without cause shall not preclude proceeding, as provided in Rule 602.

(D) The trial judge may give instructions to the jury before the taking of evidence or at anytime during the trial as the judge deems necessary and appropriate for the jury’s guidance in hearing the case.

Verdicts

Rule 648. Verdicts.

(A) Upon retiring to deliberate, the jury shall select one of its members as foreman.

(B) The verdict shall be unanimous, and shall be announced by the foreman in open court in the presence of a judge, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant and defendant’s attorney, except as provided in Rule 602.

(C) If there are two or more defendants, the jury may report a verdict or verdicts with respect to those defendants, upon which it has agreed, and the judge shall receive all such verdicts. If the jury cannot agree upon a verdict with respect to all of the defendants, the verdicts which have been received shall be recorded.

(D) If there are two or more counts in the information or indictment, the jury may report a verdict or verdicts with respect to those counts upon which it has agreed, and the judge shall receive and record all such verdicts. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all the counts in the information or indictment if those counts to which it has agreed operate as an acquittal of lesser or greater included offenses to which they cannot agree, these latter counts shall be dismissed. When the counts in the information or indictment upon which the jury cannot agree are not included offenses of the counts in the information or indictment upon which it has agreed, the defendant or defendants may be retried on those counts in the information or indictment.

(E) If there are two or more informations or indictments, the jury may report a verdict or verdicts with respect to those informations or indictments upon which it has agreed, and the judge shall receive and record all such verdicts. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all the informations or indictments, if those informations or indictments to which it has agreed operate as an acquittal of lesser or greater included offenses to which they cannot agree, these latter informations or indictments shall be dismissed. When the informations or indictments upon which the jury cannot agree are not included in the offenses of the information or indictment upon which it has agreed, the defendant or defendants may be retried on those informations or indictments.

(F) If there is a summary offense joined with the misdemeanor, felony, or murder charge that was tried before the jury, the trial judge shall not remand the summary offense to the issuing authority. The summary offense shall be disposed of in the court of common pleas, and the verdict with respect to the summary offense shall be recorded in the same manner as the verdict with respect to the other charges.

(G) Before a verdict, whether oral or sealed, is recorded, the jury shall be polled at the request of any party. Except where the verdict is sealed, if upon such poll there is no concurrence, the jury shall be directed to retire for further deliberations.

Sealed Verdict

Rule 649. Sealed Verdict.

(A) Upon the consent of all parties the judge may permit the jury to seal its verdict.

(B) The sealed verdict shall remain in the custody of the foreman of the jury who shall bring it to the next session of court stated by the trial judge. Once a verdict is sealed, the jurors may separate, but all jurors must return to open court to render the jury’s verdict, with all parties present.

(C) If upon the poll of a jury there is no concurrence with a sealed verdict, the judge shall not accept the verdict, but shall declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Part-Time Lovers?

Okay... so I was partially wrong originally... but I'm happy to report that several reliable sources say:

'John Roecker paid/gave/donated approx. $50,000.00 to Harlow Cuadra's 'defense fund'... payment for services rendered from his interview, which aired on HereTV.'

Meanwhile... I encourage Mr. Roecker to respond if I'm incorrect... though I'm also sure Howard Mitchell Halford is quite relieveved... afterall... it'll be less money spent on his part.

I don't expect to hear from either... but who knows... it would be nice.

Monday, January 19, 2009

Cuadra’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

DEFENDANT CUADRA’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DEFENDANT’S’ MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE FILED NUNC PRO TUNC

TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LUZERNE COUNTY:

The Defendant, HARLOW RAYMOND CUADRA, by and through his appointed counsel, Stephen Menn, Esquire and Michael B. Senape, Esquire, hereby submits the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of Defendants’ Motions to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle Filed Nunc Pro Tunc:

I. Brief Procedural History
II. Findings of Fact
III. Conclusions of Law
IV. Conflicts of Law

I. Brief Procedural History

Brief Procedural History

1. On or about August 12, 2008, Defendant Kerekes, by and through his appointed counsel, Shelley L. Centini, Esquire and John B. Pike, Esquire, presented a Petitionto File Summary Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc to Judge Olszewski, requesting additional time for Defendant Kerekes to file a Motion to Suppress evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007.

2. On August 12, 2008, Judge Olszewski entered an Order granting Defendant Kerekes permission to file the Motion to Suppress evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007. This Order was docketed, along with the Petition To File Summary Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, on August 13, 2008 by the Luzerne County Clerk of Courts.

3. On August 19, 2008, Judge Olszewski entered an Order extending the time for the briefing schedule for Defendant Kerekes and the Commonwealth based upon Defendant Kerekes’ representations that the Commonwealth had still not supplied Defendant Kerekes with any search warrants or other documents relating to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007. This Order was docketed, along with the Defendant Kerekes’ Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Defendant’s Brief in Support of His Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized from Defendant’s Vehicle, on August 19, 2008 by the Luzerne County Clerk of Courts.

4. In Defendant Kerekes’ Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Defendant’s Brief in Support of His Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized from Defendant’s Vehicle, Attorney Centini points out to the Court that from July 17, 2008, through the date of the filing of said Motion, the Commonwealth had not produced any search warrants or other documents relating to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007.

5. The Court, in its August 19, 2008 Order scheduled the hearing and/or argument on Defendant Kerekes’ Motion to Suppress for September 22, 2008 at 1:00PM in Courtroom No. 2 of the Luzerne County Courthouse.

6. Defendant Kerekes filed his Brief in Support of His Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle and/or His Home with the Luzerne County Clerk of Courts on September 5, 2008.

7. The Commonwealth flied its Answer to Defendant Joseph Kerekes’ Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized from Defendant’s Vehicle and supporting Brief on September 19, 2008.

8. On September 22, 2008, at approximately 12:30P.M., the Commonwealth served the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, with approximately 130 pages of discovery allegedly relating to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007. This was the first time the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, was provided with any information and/or documentation relating to the to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007.

II. Findings of Fact

FINDINGS OF FACT

9. The hearing before Judge Olszewski on Defendant Kerekes’ Motion to Suppress commenced on September 22, 2008 at 1:00P.M. The undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, was merely present to observe the testimony and arguments presented by Defendant Kerekes and the Commonwealth to determine what action, if any, would be pursued on Defendant Cuadra’s behalf since the Commonwealth had not formally served Defendant Cuadra with the within referenced evidence until one half hour prior to the September 22, 2008 hearing. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 39 and 42-45)

10. Prior to the conclusion of the September 22, 2008 hearing, the Court, sua sponte, requested a side bar with counsel for Defendant Kerekes and the Commonwealth and undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, to inquire as to Defendant Cuadra’s position regarding Defendant Kerekes Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle and/or His Home. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 38-39)

11. The Court’s inquiry regarding Defendant Cuadra’s position was based upon Assistant District Attorney Michael Melnick’s conduct in presenting exhibits to the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, prior to presentation of said exhibits to the witness for the Commonwealth, Detective Matthew Patrick Childress of the Virginia Beach Police Department, which had the effect of including Defendant Cuadra in the hearing without Defendant Cuadra being physically present in the courtroom for the hearing. This discussion occurred off the record. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 38, Lns 19-22)

12. The Court, in an effort to ensure fairness to all parties and given the representations of the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, regarding the Commonwealth not having provided certain discovery to Defendant Cuadra relating to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007, adjourned the hearing and directed the Commonwealth to turn over all documents and/or evidence relating to the evidence seized during the arrest of both Defendants, Cuadra and Kerekes, in Virginia on or about May 15, 2007, it had in its possession, and that it had previously provided to Defendant Kerekes, to the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 45-50).

13. The Court granted the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire, and Defendant Cuadra 10 days to file a pleading joining in Defendant Kerekes’ Motion to Suppress, file his own Motion to Suppress or any other action Defendant Cuadra, and his appointed counsel, deemed appropriate for his defense. The Court indicated that, depending on the course of action taken by Defendant Cuadra, the Court would set a date and time for the continuation of the hearing on said Motion and, if necessary, direct the Commonwealth to present the witness, Detective Matthew Patrick Childress of the Virginia Beach Police Department, again for testimony and subject to cross examination in the presence of Defendant Cuadra. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 45-50)

14. On October 1, 2008, the undersigned, Michael B. Senape, Esquire and Stephen Menn, Esquire, after consultation with Defendant Cuadra and after review of Defendant Kerekes’ pleading and the discovery from the Commonwealth, as well as the testimony presented at the hearing on September 22, 2008, and Defendant regarding the Search Warrant, Defendant Cuadra filed Defendant Cuadra’s Joinder in Defendant Kerekes’Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle Nunc Pro Tunc and Defendant Kerekes’ Brief in Support of thereof.

15. On November 20, 2008, at the Pre-Trial Conference Judge Olszewski scheduled the final suppression hearing regarding the Defendants’ Motions to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle for December 4, 2008.

16. The final suppression hearing regarding the Defendants’ Motions to Suppress Physical Evidence Seized From Defendant’s Vehicle commenced on December 4, 2008 at 9:17A.M. before Judge Olszewski. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 5)

17. Matthew Patrick Childress (“Childress”) is a detective who has been employed by the City of Virginia Beach Police Department since 1998. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 2, Ln 23)

18. For the past 3 years Childress has been assigned to the City of Virginia Beach Police Department’s Special Investigation Division (“SID”), where he has investigated organized crime, vice, narcotics, money laundering, prostitution and other related offenses. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 6)

19. Childress identified both Defendant Cuadra and Defendant Kerekes in open court as individuals that were the subject of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (WRICO investigation in Virginia Beach, VA regarding a business known as Norfolk Companions as an alleged illegal escort company, which was working out of the Hampton Roads area of Virginia Beach, which investigation was based upon police informants who had been working for Childress and had worked with the Defendants. (NT. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 6-8) and (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 4-5)

20. Childress testified that he had personally viewed and printed out a page from the Defendants’ website, Boisrus’, which was marked and admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 1, which detailed the different services that the Defendants’ business offered, including the use of a specific type of vehicle, “2006 BMW M5 - the fastest luxury sedan on the planet.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 10).

21. Childress testified that he had no information or belief that any type of weapon, namely a knife, was used as part of the alleged escort or prostitution ring which he was investigating regarding the Defendants. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 58).

22. Sometime in January 2007, Childress was informed that the Pennsylvania State Police and other law enforcement officials were conducting a homicide investigation and Childress was requested to assist in that investigation and to share information he had gained regarding the money laundering and prostitution investigation of the Defendants. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 13-14 and 16)

23. On May 15, 2007, Childress learned that the Pennsylvania Authorities were going to arrest the Defendants for capital homicide and Childress was preparing a search and seizure warrant for the Defendants’ joint Residence at 1028 Stratem Court, Virginia Beach, VA (“Defendants Residence”) and the Defendants’ bank accounts. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 6-8).

24. For a few days prior to May 15, 2007, Childress and the Virginia Beach Police Department had the Defendants and Defendants’ Residence under 24 hour surveillance and the Defendants were primarily staying at the Defendants’ Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/ 08 at 7).

25. Childress testified that on May 14, 2007 he met with Attorney Paul Powers, a Commonwealth of Virginia Attorney, to review the search and seizure warrant for the Defendants’ residence, which was marked and admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, and thereafter he and Attorney Powers presented the search and seizure warrant along with a sealing order affidavit to Judge Shadrick of Commonwealth of Virginia Circuit Judge, who signed both the search and seizure warrant and the sealing order affidavit on May 14, 2007 (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 17-20).

26. Childress testified that there was a typographical error on the warrant in that on the bottom left-hand corner of the search and seizure warrant the date of issuance is type written as “May 16, 2007”. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 17).

27. Childress admitted that he, the Commonwealth Attorney and the Judge missed the error of the “May 16, 2007” and that no one new of the error of the incorrect date on the face of the search and seizure warrant for the Defendants’ Residence until the initial suppression hearing in September 2008 (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 41-43).

28. Childress admitted that at least four or five people with many, many years of experience didn’t catch the error. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 41-43).

29. Childress testified that after on May 15, 2007 the Virginia Beach Police Department planned on using its tactical team to effect an arrest and to execute the search and seizure warrant on the Defendants’ Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 21).

30. Leo D. Hannon, Jr. (“Hannon”), testified that he, being a member of the Pennsylvania State Police, was assigned in January 2007 to investigate the homicide of Brian Kocis and that as part of that investigation on May 15, 2007, he obtained arrest warrants for the Defendants from Magisterial District Judge Tupper. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 108).

31. Hannon testified that he had contacted the Virginia Beach Police Department and they jointly determined that the Pennsylvania arrest warrants would be hand delivered to the Virginia Beach Police Department and the arrests of the Defendants would be effected by the Virginia Beach Police Department’s SWAT Unit.(N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 108).

32. Hannon testified that the Pennsylvania arrest warrants for the Defendants were issued between approximately 9:30A.M. and 9:45A.M. on May 15, 2007. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 109).

33. Hannon testified that he left the effectuation and service of the Pennsylvania arrest warrants for the Defendants to the discretion of the Virginia Beach Police Department. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 112).

34. Childress was aware of the specific information of the BMW, namely its make, model, year, owner, lien holder, from a DMV transcript of it, which was introduced during the hearing as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 5, which Childress used in preparing the search and seizure warrant for Defendants’ Residence and vehicles. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 34).

35. Despite knowing the specific detailed information about the BMW, Childress did not include it specifically in the search and seizure warrant affidavit and testified that he had no reason why he did not specifically list the vehicle. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 94).

36. The purpose of the search and seizure warrant set forth in Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2 was to find, seize and forfeit all items related to the RICO investigation and no where in Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2 was there any reference to any type of weapon to be searched for, seized or forfeited, including any knife. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 58, 75-76)

37. The search warrant authorized the seizure of items generally that were in the home or on the curtliage. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 94).

38. During the morning hours of May 15, 2007, Childress, while at the Special Investigations Division building ( was informed that the Pennsylvania State Police had arrest warrants signed for the Defendants and was also informed by the Virginia Beach Police Department surveillance that at approximately 10:30 A.M. Defendants were beginning to leave the Residence with some sort of personal bag or luggage. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 23-24) and (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 12).

39. The bag which Defendant Cuadra was seen leaving the Residence with prior to the vehicle being stopped was not a suitcase, was smaller than the size of an overnight bag and was just for personal items. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 54-55).

40. Childress testified that the item of luggage that Defendant Cuadra was seen leaving the Residence with was actually a shaving bag where you put a razor, shaving cream, toothbrush, and toothpaste in. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 94).

41. Childress testified that the original plan was to execute the search and seizure warrant while the Defendants’ were in the Residence, but the plan was later changed for tactical and safety reasons to take the Defendants while they were outside of the Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 24).

42. The search and seizure warrant under which Childress and the Virginia Beach Police Department was acting included language that all vehicles on the curtilage of the residence could be searched and seized.(N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 25).

43. On May 15, 2007, the members of the Pennsylvania State Police investigating the Defendants and who were in possession of the arrest warrants did not have direct communication with Childress but rather his supervisor, Sergeant Winn, the on-site supervisor at the Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 25).

44. The Defendants were stopped by uniformed patrol officers of the Virginia Beach Police Department in the 3900 block of Virginia Beach Boulevard, which is approximately 5 miles from the Residence for a “traffic stop” [emphasis added]. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 27-28) and (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 13).

45. The Defendants were being followed by the uniformed patrol officers of the Virginia Beach Police Department and were stopped in the 3900 block of Virginia Beach Boulevard because they had criminal homicide warrants outstanding from the State of Pennsylvania. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 9/22/08 at 29).

46. When the Defendants were pulled over in Virginia they were not cited for any other criminal offenses in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Defendants did not offer any resistance to the Police and were not arrested for any violation of Virginia Law, and the only reason they were pulled over was because the Virginia Beach Police Department was informed by the Pennsylvania State Police that there was an arrest warrant issued from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 48-49).

47. The BMW and the Defendants were not stopped on the curtilage of the Defendants’ Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 94-95).

48. Childress testified that the search of the BMW was not pursuant to the search warrant. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 95).

49. Childress testified that he had no knowledge that any part of the vehicle, including glove compartments or closed containers were search by the Virginia Beach Police Department as searches incident to arrest. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 77-80).

50. Virginia Beach Police Department considered the BMW a tow when the Defendants were taken into custody and the BMW was driven by one of the Virginia Beach Police Department Detectives to the SID. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 28-29).

51. Childress testified that the inventory search of the BMW was done pursuant to and in compliance with 2 Virginia Beach Police Department policies, General Order 6.01 — Constitutional Issues, marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 3, and General Order 12.12 — Abandoned Vehicles, Towing and Inventory Procedures, marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 4. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 29-29).

52. Childress testified that the policies were followed in this particular case, that the inventory search in this case served 2 purposes, to protect the personal property of the Defendants and documenting of any evidence recovered from the vehicle and that all items found during the inventory search were documented on a Property Voucher form entitled PD 78-4. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 30-31).

53. Childress testified that the purpose of the inventory search on the BMW was pursuant to the policy which reads:

Officers have a responsibility to protect property in their custody. This responsibility includes property within motor vehicles or boats which have been seized, towed, or otherwise removed from the custody of their owner by direction of the officer. . .Laxity in this regard can result in property losses which could have been averted by precautionary measures taken by the officer. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 51).

54. Childress testified that the forms used and completed by the Virginia Beach Police Department, including himself, during the inventory search performed on the BMW at the SID were out of date and not in compliance with the specific provisions of the Virginia Beach Police Department policies. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 61 and 74-75)

55. Childress testified that Virginia Beach Police Department General Order 6.01 — Constitutional Issues, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 3, was effective January 9, 2007 and General Order 12.12 — Abandoned Vehicles, Towing and Inventory Procedures, Commonwealth’s Exhibit NO. 4, was effective September 15, 2005. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 61).

56. Childress testified that Defendant Cuadra’s Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, are the Property and Evidence Vouchers for both the items taken from the Residence and the items taken from the BMW, and items turned over to the Pennsylvania State Police, including the Sig Sauer folding knife. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 62-74).

57. Childress testified that there were no exigent circumstances at the time of the inventory search that required the Police from removing the Sig Sauer knife from the BMW since the BMW was in a secure location at the SID. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 74).

58. In response to questioning by ADA Melnick, Childress testified that he did not seize the knife at the direction of law enforcement official of the state of Pennsylvania. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 89).

59. The policy of Virginia Beach Police Department with regard to inventory searches is a policy similar to that of police departments all over the country. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 95).

60. The purpose of this inventory is essentially to protect property owned by the owner of the vehicle. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 95).

61. Childress testified that the knife was taken as evidence and labeled as evidence on the Property and Evidence Voucher even though there was no knife listed as an item subject to search, seizure and forfeiture under the search and seizure warrant. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 76-77).

62. The knife was not taken as evidence of the RICO or prostitution investigation, but was held as evidence for the State of Pennsylvania based upon Childress’ knowledge of the circumstances involved in Pennsylvania’s investigation. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 97).

63. Childress testified that he never thought about going to get a revised search warrant once the knife was found, he simply took possession of it, labeled it evidence and turned it over the Hannon based upon his knowledge of the Pennsylvania case. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 74).

64. Childress testified that the BMW was considered an item or fruit of prostitution and therefore contraband. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 32).

65. Neither Childress nor the Virginia Beach Police Department had a search warrant for the BMW outside the curtilage of the Defendants’ Residence. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 51-52).

66. Childress testified that the BMW did go through forfeiture proceedings but the vehicle was eventually returned to the vehicle’s lien holder, the Commonwealth of Virginia Attorney believed could be sold for via the forfeiture proceedings. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 88-89).

67. There was coordination by Childress and the Virginia Beach Police Department and the Pennsylvania State Police that the search warrant for the home would take place on the same day the arrest warrant for the Defendants in the Pennsylvania homicide was issued. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 98-99).

68. Childress provided conflicting testimony as to the basis for the decision to stop the Defendants on Virginia Beach Boulevard and Childress did not have any personal knowledge of the specific exigent circumstances supporting the stop of the Defendants at that specific time and location. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 99-103).

69. Childress eventually admitted to the Court that exigent circumstances had nothing to do with the stop and arrest of the Defendants on May 15, 2007 and the specific reason for their stop and arrest was the active homicide warrants from Pennsylvania. (N.T. Suppression Hearing 12/4/08 at 103).

III. Conclusions of Law


CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VEHICLE SEARCH

Vehicle Search Was Warrantless

70. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, does not apply to the search of the BMW post-arrest.

71. Despite the admitted error on the face of the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, examination of this warrant reveals that application for the search warrant affidavit was made on May 14, 2007, the day before the Defendants were arrested.

72. Based upon the admitted errors set forth in the Findings of Fact above, the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, itself was not valid until May 16, 2007, the day after the Defendants were arrested.

73. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, was not valid the day the Defendants were arrested.

74. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No 2, only relates to the Virginia Beach Police Department’s alleged investigation and prosecution of the Defendants on Conspiracy to Violate Virginia’s RICO statute, Conspiracy to Launder Money and Conspiracy to Receive Money from Earnings of Male or Female Prostitutes.

75. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, does not relate to the Pennsylvania prosecution of the Defendants for Criminal Homicide.

76. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, only authorizes search of the Defendants’ home at 1028 Stratem Court, Virginia and ”... vehicles parked on the curtilage of 1028 Stratem Court.”

77. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, does not authorize search or seizure of the Defendants’ vehicles wherever located or if located on a public roadway, such as Virginia Beach Boulevard.

78. The search and seizure of the Defendants’ BMW was warrantless.

79. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, that the Commonwealth submits as authority for this search and seizure is inapplicable.

80. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, a Virginia RICO warrant, simply does not cover the search and seizure of the Defendants’ BMW on a public roadway following a traffic stop on May 15, 2007.

81. Therefore, this issue should be treated as a warrantless search and analyzed under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Virginia Law on Automobiie Exception to Warrant Requirement

82. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the united States Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule regarding warrantless searches of automobiles The Court held that “... when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Belton, 453 U.S. 454 at 460.

83. Virginia adopts the Belton analysis and has held that when determining the legality of a search of a vehicle incident to arrest, Virginia courts will examine: 1. Whether the defendant was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest; and 2. Whether the arrestee was the occupant of the vehicle that was searched. Glasco v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 257 Va. 433, 438, 513 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1999) citing People v. Savedra, 907 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Cob. 1995)

Pennsyivania Law on Automobiie Exception to the Warrant Requirement

84. Pennsylvania has held that Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding warrantless searches and seizures relating to automobiles.

85. In Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Belton automobile exception to the warrant requirement, stating that:

...this court, when considering the relative importance of privacy as against securing criminal convictions, has struck a different balance than has the United States Supreme Court, and under the Pennsylvania balance, an individual’s privacy interests are given greater deference than under federal law... Merely arresting someone does not give police carte blanche to search any property belonging to the arrestee. Certainly, a police officer may search the arrestee’s person and the area in which the person is detained in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons or destroying evidence, but otherwise, absent an exigency, the arrestee’s privacy interests remain intact as against a warrantless search. In short, there is no justifiable search incident to arrest under the Pennsylvania Constitution save for the search of the person and the immediate area which the person occupies during his custody... White at 902.

86. Further, the White court made it clear that a warrantless search of a vehicle conducted in violation of Article 1 Section 8 cannot be excused by re-naming it as an inventory search or relying on the fact that an inventory search would have revealed the same evidence. See White at 903.

87. Because Virginia’s law differs from Pennsylvania’s regarding warrantless vehicte searches and seizures, the Court must engage in a conflict of laws analysis to determine which state’s law to apply.

IV. Conflicts of Law

CONFLICTS OF LAW

88. The analysis regarding conflict of laws is identical to that articulated in the Defendants’ previously filed briefs regarding the electronic intercepts, search of Defendants’ home and statements made post-arrest.

89. To summarize, this matter presents a question of conflict between substantive and not procedural laws. See Larrison v. Larrison, 2000 Pa.Super 111, 750 A.2d 895 (2000).

90. In cases where the substantive laws of Pennsylvania conflict with those of a sister state in the civil context, Pennsylvania courts take a flexible approach which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court. See Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa.1, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964).

91. This approach gives the state having the most interest in the question paramount control over the legal issues arising from a particular factual context, thereby allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome. Id.

92. Defendant Cuadra believes that a similar approach should be taken in the criminal context where the substantive laws of this Commonwealth conflict with those of a sister state.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, et al, 552 Pa. 570, 576, 716 A.2d 1221, 1224 (1998) (Emphasis supplied).

93. Because Virginia law enforcement arrested the Defendants for Pennsylvania authorities who were en route with the Pennsylvania warrants, Pennsylvania has the greater interest in the outcome of this matter.

94. Virginia did not execute their own search warrant until the following day.

95. Further, the items seized, namely the Sig Sauer knife, relate to the Pennsylvania prosecution and not any prosecution Virginia authorities have instituted as is evidenced by the fact that Virginia turned over these items to Pennsylvania and did not retain them and based upon the Findings of Fact outlined above.

96. Defendant Cuadra was not charged with crimes in Virginia. Moreover, the “Fugitive From Justice warrant” that Virginia authorities claim they relied on to seize Defendant Cuadra does not exist. As outlined above in the Findings of Fact, the arrest warrant was issued by MDJ Tupper on May 15, 2007.

97. The Sanchez case makes these distinctions even more clear. In Sanchez, a canine sniff of a package in California which was sent to a Pennsylvania resident gave rise to the probable cause necessary for issuance of a Pennsylvania search warrant. Sanchez, 716 A.2d at 1222. The canine sniff was legal under California law but not Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1223. The Sanchez court concluded that California possessed the greater interest in the validity of the canine sniff and because the sniff complied with California law, it could be used to support probable cause in Pennsylvania. Id at 1224. Jn reaching this conclusion, the Sanchez court reasoned:

No Pennsylvania state interest would be advanced by analyzing the propriety of the canine sniff under Pennsylvania law because the canine sniff did not occur in Pennsylvania and no Pennsylvania state officer was involved in the canine sniff. * * * Thus we hold that if the courts of a sister state determine that a canine sniff is not a search in that state, the propriety of a sniff initiated by that state’s officers and conducted within that state’s borders must be evaluated under the laws of that state, Id. at 1224, 1225. (Emphasis supplied).

98. Virginia authorities did not possess any Virginia arrest warrant for Defendant Cuadra.

99. The only valid warrant Virginia authorities possessed at the time was the knowledge of the existence of the arrest warrants for the Defendants from Pennsylvania.

100. The items at issue, namely the knife, were turned over to Pennsylvania authorities.

101. Virginia authorities never charged the Defendants with any crimes.

102. Analysis compels the result that Pennsylvania law applies to the search of the Defendants’ BMW and the seizure of items, namely the knife, therefrom. Analysis Under Pennsylvania Law.

103. Under Pennsylvania law, a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest violates Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution. See Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995).

104. Once Mr. Cuadra was in custody, there was no reason to dispense with the warrant requirement if police wanted to search the car for investigatory purposes.

105. Under a Pennsylvania analysis, it is very clear that the items seized should be suppressed as they are fruits of an illegal search. Analysis Under Virginia Law

106. In applying Belton to the analysis of warrantless vehicle searches, Virginia courts will examine: 1. Whether the defendant was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest; and 2. Whether the arrestee was the occupant of the vehicle that was searched. Glasco v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 257 Va. 433, 438, 513 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1999) clUng People v. Savedra, 907 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Cob. 1995).

107. Again, the scope of the search extends only to the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 at 460.

108. The purpose of a search without warrant contemporaneous to arrest is the need, to remove any weapons that [ arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or to effect his escape” and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. Chime! v. Cailfornia, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

109. Here, there is no question that Defendant Cuadra was an occupant of the BMW that was searched and that if the items were seized from Defendant Cuadra’s passenger compartment, the seizure would be valid under Virginia law.

110. However, Defendant Cuadra reasserts that Pennsylvania law controls the situation and therefore compels the result that any seizure of evidence from the defendant’s vehicle was warrantless, incident to arrest, and should be suppressed.

Law and Argument—Home Search

111. The Defendants’ home was searched pursuant to the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, the Virginia RICO warrant, the day after their arrest, on May 16, 2007. Police reports and inventories allege that the items at issue—the knife, laptop computers, a camcorder, tapes and a Sprint mobile air card, were seized at the home by Virginia authorities pursuant to this RICO warrant and turned over to Pennsylvania authorities for use in the Pennsylvania homicide prosecution.

112. The corrupt organization that Virginia alleges the Defendants were involved in is prostitution.

113. The items sought by the affidavit accompanying the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, relate to the business of the illegal enterprise.

114. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, authorizes the seizure of all items at issue herein, except for the Sig Sauer knife.

No Conflict of Laws—Seizure of Knife Illegal Under Virginia Law

115. The search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, the RICO warrant, was initiated and executed by Virginia law enforcement without involvement or at the behest of Pennsylvania.

116. Therefore, Virginia’s laws apply to the execution of the RICO warrant.

117. Virginia search warrant law requires that search warrants may issue upon reasonable and probable cause. Va.Code §19.2-52.

118. The following things may be seized upon specification in the warrant:

(1) weapons or other objects used in the commission of the crime; (2) Articles or things the sale or possession of which is unlawful; (3) Stolen property or the fruits of any crime; and (4) Any object, thing, or person, including without limitation, documents, books, papers, records or body fluids, constituting evidence of the commission of crime... Va.Code §19.2-53.

The affidavit supporting the search warrant must: “... reasonably describe the place, thing, or person to be searched, the things or persons to be searched for thereunder, alleging briefly material facts, constituting the probable cause for the issuance of such warrant and alleging substantially the offense in relation to which such search is to be made and that the object, thing or person searched for constitutes evidence of the commission of such offense.” Va.Code §19.2-54. (Emphasis
supplied).

119. The warrant must, inter alia, describe the property or person to be searched for and “recite that the magistrate has found probable cause to believe that the property or person constitutes evidence of a crime (identified in the warrant) or tends to show that a person (named or described therein) has committed or is vommitting a crime.” Va.Code §19.2-56.”The warrant shall be executed by the search of the place described. . . and, if property described in the warrant is found there, by the seizure of the property.” Va.Code §19.2-57. (Emphasis supplied)

120. It has long been established that a search made pursuant to a warrant may not go beyond the property described in the warrant and must be reasonably conducted to turn up the materials described. See Matron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).

121. The seizure of the Sig Sauer knife exceeded the scope of the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, and any legal authority.

122. Although it is a weapon, the Sig Sauer knife it is not a weapon alleged to have been used in the commission of the crime of prostitution or RICO violations for which the search warrant, Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, was issued. See Va.Code §9.2-53.

123. Indeed, Virginia authorities had no intention to use the Sig Sauer knife in their anticipated prosecution of the Defendants on RICO charges as they immediately turned the Sig Sauer knife over to Hannon of the Pennsylvania State Police for his use in the Pennsylvania homicide prosecution. See Defendant Cuadra Exhibit No. 44

124. The Sig Sauer knife was not encompassed by the warrant nor has its seizure been authorized.

125. Further, the Sig Sauer knife is not per se illegal or contraband.

126. Because Defendant Cuadra had already been placed in custody the day before, there was no danger he would destroy or use the Sig Sauer knife.

127. There was no reason that Pennsylvania authorities, who were in the area at the time, could not have accompanied Virginia authorities for a separate warrant authorizing the seizure of the Sig Sauer knife for the Pennsylvania prosecution.

128. Even though the seizure of the Sig Sauer knife was not authorized in the warrant, the Commonwealth may rely on the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement if certain factors are met.

129. Under the Fourth Amendment, police may seize an item without a warrant if it is plain view, its incriminatory character is immediately apparent, and the officer is lawfully in the place where the seizure occurs and has lawful right of access to that object. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

130. In the instant case, the incriminatory character of the Sig Sauer knife is not immediately apparent.

131. Therefore, the Commonwealth cannot even avail itself of an exception to the warrant requirement to justify the seizure of the Sig Sauer knife.

132. Therefore, the Sig Sauer knife should be suppressed.

Sunday, January 18, 2009

So Who's this blogger PC?


Yep... that's me in Anchorage, Alaska (no... I don't live there thankfully... though I visit often).

Am I an attorney? No.

Am I a local reporter? No

Am I a former client? No

Am I a former employee? No

---
I will however be at the trial... and plan to announce additional tidbits shortly... to think that I'm willing to show a picture of myself... hmm... I guess I must be crazy. ;)

Note: This image is protected under a registered copyright, so here's a hint... don't use or copy it (fair-use won't work)... any violation could be faced with a fine of up to $150,000. Please don't think I'm kidding.

Motion to Pay Expert Psychiatrist Invoice

(click image below to enlarge):

Invoice 3

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2009. Upon receipt and review of the attached Motion to Pay Expert Psychiatrist Invoice, it is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that:

1. The Luzerne County Controller approve the payment of the Invoice, attached as “Exhibit 2” to the Motion, in the amount of $1920.00; and

2. The Luzerne County Treasurer issue a check payable to “Richard E. Fischbein, M.D., XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX, X XXXXX, XXX XXXXXXX XXX., XXXXXXXX, PA XXXXX” in the amount of $1920.00 for services rendered, representing payment in full.

BY THE COURT:

Peter Paul Olszewski Jr.

MOTION TO PAY EXPERT CRIMINOLOGIST INVOICE

The defendant, Joseph Manuel Kerekes (“Mr. Kerekes”), by and through his counsel, Shelley L. Centini, Esq. and John Pike, Esq. Court-Appointed Conflict Counselors for Luzerne County, respecttully requests this Court to Order payment of psychiatric evaluation invoice and represents as follows:

1. Mr. Kerekes is an adult individual presently incarcerated and serving a life sentence after pleading guilty to second degree murder and other offenses an December 8, 2008.

2. On May 15, 2007 Mr. Kerekes was charged by Criminal Complaint with the following offenses: Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 2501 (a)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), Liability for the Conduct of Another/Complicity (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 306(B)(3)(ii)), Arson and Related Offenses—Recklessly endangering (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301(a)(1)(i)), Arson and Related Offenses—Inhabited Building (Title 16 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301 (a)(1)(ii)), Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3502(a)), Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3701 (a)(1)(i)), Theft by Unlawful Taking (Title 18 Pa.CS. Sec. 3921 (a)), Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 491 0(1)), Abuse of Corpse (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 5510), Conspiracy to Commit Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C Sec. 903(a)(1)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), and Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Arson—Recklessly endangering (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)).

3. On October 1, 2007 the Commonwealth filed their Notice of Aggravating Circumstances, advising that they intended to seek the death penalty against Mr. Kerekes.

4. In preparation for jury trial and/or penalty phase, on August 19, 2008 this Court approved counsel’s request to engage additional services of Richard M. Fischbein, M.D. for four hours at $1920.00 for additional work on the defendant’s case. S Order attached as “Exhibit I.“

5. On December 9, 2008, Dr. Fischbein sent his bill to counsel. The bill totals $1920.00 See Invoice attached as “Exhibit 2.”

6. Conflict counsel are appointed by the Court to defendants who qualify for representation by the Public Defender’s Office because of their indigency but whom the Public Defender’s Office cannot represent given a conflict of interest.

7. As of the date of this Petition, the undersigned is aware of no substantial change in the defendant’s financial condition since the court appointment of counsel. The defendant is unable to pay the fees and costs associated with the psychiatric evaluation from his own funds.

8. The engagement of Dr. Fischbein was essential to a fair trial and to the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel and due process and equal protection of law as guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order directing that the Luzerne County Controller approve payment of the Invoice attached in the amount of $1920.00 and directing the Luzerne County Treasurer to issue a check payable to “Richard E. Fischbein, M.D.” in the amount of $1920.00 as payment in full of the attached invoice.

Respectfully Submitted,

SHELLEY L. CENTINI, ESQ.
Conflict Counsel for Defendant

Motion to Pay Expert Criminologist Invoice

(click image below to enlarge):

Invoice 2

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2009, upon receipt and review of the affached Motion to Pay Expert Criminologist Invoice, it is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that:

1. The Luzerne County Controller approve the payment of the Invoice, attached as “Exhibit 2” to the Motion, in the amount of $400.00; and

2. The Luzerne County Treasurer issue a check payable to “Robert Johnson, Ph.D., XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX, XXXXX, VA XXXXX” in the amount of $400.00 for services rendered, representing payment in full.

BY THE COURT:

Peter Paul Olszewski Jr.


MOTION TO PAY EXPERT CRIMINOLOGIST INVOICE

The defendant, Joseph Manuel Kerekes (“Mr. Kerekes”), by and through his counsel, Shelley L. Centini, Esq. and John Pike, Esq. Court-Appointed Conflict Counselors for Luzerne County, respecttully requests this Court to Order payment of criminologist invoice and represents as follows:

1. Mr. Kerekes is an adult individual presently incarcerated and serving a life sentence after pleading guilty to second degree murder and other offenses an December 8, 2008.

2. On May 15, 2007 Mr. Kerekes was charged by Criminal Complaint with the following offenses: Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 2501 (a)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), Liability for the Conduct of Another/Complicity (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 306(B)(3)(ii)), Arson and Related Offenses—Recklessly endangering (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301(a)(1)(i)), Arson and Related Offenses—Inhabited Building (Title 16 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301 (a)(1)(ii)), Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3502(a)), Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3701 (a)(1)(i)), Theft by Unlawful Taking (Title 18 Pa.CS. Sec. 3921 (a)), Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 491 0(1)), Abuse of Corpse (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 5510), Conspiracy to Commit Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C Sec. 903(a)(1)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), and Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Arson—Recklessly endangering (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)).

3. On October 1, 2007 the Commonwealth filed their Notice of Aggravating Circumstances, advising that they intended to seek the death penalty against Mr. Kerekes.

4. In preparation for jury trial and/or penalty phase, on November 20, 2008 this Court approved counsel’s request to engage the services of Dr. Robert Johnson as defendant’s expert criminologist at a rate not to exceed $5000.00 for work on the defendant’s case. Order attached as “Exhibit I.”

5. On December 17, 2008, Dr. Johnson sent his bill to counsel. The bill totals $400.00. Invoice attached as “Exhibit 2.”

6. Conflict counsel are appointed by the Court to defendants who qualify for representation by the Public Defender’s Office because of their indigency but whom the Public Defender’s Office cannot represent given a conflict of interest.

7. As of the date of this Petition, the undersigned is aware of no substantial change in the defendant’s financial condition since the court appointment of counsel. The defendant is unable to pay the fees and costs associated with the expert criminologist from his own funds.

8. The engagement of Dr. Johnson was essential to a fair trial and to the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel and due process and equal protection of law as guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

WHEREFORE, the defendant respecifully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order directing that the Luzerne County Controller approve payment of the Invoice attached in the amount of $400.00 and directing the Luzerne County Treasurer to issue a check payable to “Robert Johnson, Ph.D.” in the amount of $400.00 as payment in full of the attached invoice.

Respectfully Submitted,

SHELLEY L. CENTINI, ESQ.
Conflict Counsel for Defendant

Friday, January 16, 2009

Motion to Pay Computer Forensic Expert Invoice

This story was originally mentioned last Friday, and I'll now be posting the three mentioned invoices separately. It should also be noted that I was incorrect in my original post stating that this was being billed to Joseph Kerekes (thanks for catching that will g). These invoices are in fact being billed to the Luzerne County Courts. My apologies for the original error. (Simply click the image below to enlarge):

Invoice 1

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2009 upon receipt and review of the attached Motion to Pay Computer Forensic Expert Invoice, it is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that:

1. The Luzerne County Controller approve the payment of the Invoice, attached as “Exhibit 2” to the Motion, in the amount of $4990.16; and

2. The Luzerne County Treasurer issue a check payable to “Surveillance Technology Group, Inc., XXXXXX, XXXXXXXX, PA XXXXX” in the amount of $4990.16 for services rendered, representing payment in full.

BY THE COURT:

Peter Paul Olszewski Jr.


MOTION TO PAY COMPUTER FORENSIC EXPERT IN VOICE

The defendant, Joseph Manuel Kerekes (“Mr. Kerekes”), by and through his counsel, Shelley L. Centini, Esq. and John Pike, Esq. Court-Appointed Conflict Counselors for Luzerne County, respectfully requests this Court to Order payment of computer forensic expert invoice and represents as follows:

1. Mr. Kerekes is an adult individual presently incarcerated and serving a life sentence after pleading guilty to second degree murder and other offenses on December 8, 2008.

2. On May 15, 2007 Mr. Kerekes was charged by Criminal Complaint with the following offenses: Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 2501 (a)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Homicide (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)), Liability for the Conduct of Another/Complicity (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 306(B)(3)(ii)), Arson and Related Offenses—Recklessly endangering (Title 16 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301(a)(1)(i)), Arson and Related Offenses—Inhabited Building (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3301 (a)(1)(ii)), Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3502(a)), Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3701(a)(1)(i)), Theft by Unlawful Taking (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3921 (a)), Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 4910(1)), Abuse of Corpse (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 5510), Conspiracy to Commit Burglary (Title 18 Pa.C.S Sec. 903(a)(1)), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Robbery (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1 )), Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Tampering with Physical Evidence (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a) (1)), and Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Arson—Recklessly endangering (Title 18 Pa.C.S. Sec. 903(a)(1)).

3. On October 1, 2007 the Commonwealth filed their Notice of Aggravating Circumstances, advising that they intended to seek the death penalty against Mr. Kerekes.

4. In preparation for jury trial and/or penalty phase, on June 16, 2008 this Court approved counsel’s request to engage the services of Sherman Nowlin of Surveillance Technology Group, Inc., as defendant’s computer forensic expert at a rate not to exceed $5000.00 for work on the defendant’s case. Order attached as “Exhibit 1.”

5. On December 13, 2008, Mr. Nowlin sent his bill to counsel. The bill totals $4990.16. See Invoice attached as “Exhibit 2.”

6. Conflict counsel are appointed by the Court to defendants who qualify for representation by the Public Defender’s Office because of their indigency but whom the Public Defender’s Office cannot represent given a conflict of interest.

7. As of the date of this Petition, the undersigned is aware of no substantial change in the defendant’s financial condition since the court appointment of counsel. The defendant is unable to pay the fees and costs associated with the computer forensic expert from his own funds.

8. The engagement of Mr. Nowlin was essential to a fair trial and to the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel and due process and equal protection of law as guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order directing that the Luzerne County Controller approve payment of the Invoice attached in the amount of $4990.16 and directing the Luzerne County Treasurer to issue a check payable to “Surveillance Technology Group, Inc.” in the amount of $4990.16 as payment in full of the attached invoice.

Respectfully Submitted,

SHELLEY L. CENTINI, ESQ.
Conflict Counsel for Defendant

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Joseph Kerekes: Inmate #HW4382

SCI Camp Hill

Joseph Kerekes has officially left Luzerne County, and is now living at SCI Camp Hill, which is just across the river from Harrisburg, PA. Here... Joe will spend the next four to six weeks undergoing the standard diagnostic and classification process, where he'll be tested for mental, physical, and emotional problems so that he can receive a correctional plan (more about the procedure can be found here).

Once this is completed, Joe will be given a classification level, and it will then be determined at which facility he'll carry out his life sentence.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Joseph Kerekes' Blog Returns....

For several months now, Joseph Kerekes' so-called 'blog' has been offline (URL not found), and now all of a sudden it's back...

Gotta love this statement from 02/08:

"For all of you who seem to want to banter on about plea deals there are no deals now or in the future. I will be going to trial and I am innocent! I have three great lawyers that will help me through this process. Please have faith in me and this process."

Interestingly, it's still accepting donations too... even though he's already pleaded guilty to second-degree murder... go figure.

Sunday, January 11, 2009

First... Second... Third... or None?

A couple of weeks ago I posted a poll that asked: 'what do you think a jury will find Harlow Cuadra guilty of: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, third-degree murder, or innocent?'.

Interestingly an over-whelming majority chose "first-degree murder".

Now I'm not sure if that's because of personal wishes, or thoughts based upon law... but since we're getting closer to Harlow's trial, I'd like to know the reason as to why you chose what you did... assuming you don't mind sharing.

Meanwhile... here's the Pennsylvania Crimes Code:

Part II. DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC OFFENSES CHAPTER 25
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE:

§ 2501. Criminal Homicide:

(a) Offense defined: A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.

(b) Classification: Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.

§ 2502. Murder:

(a) Murder of the first degree: A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.

(b) Murder of the second degree: A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.

(c) Murder of the third degree: All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a felony of the first degree.

(d) Definitions: As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

"Intentional killing":
Killing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.

"Perpetration of a felony":
The act of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.

"Principal":
A person who is the actor or perpetrator of the crime.

It should also be noted that the penalties for each offense are as follows (maximum time):

(1) Murder of the first degree: Mandatory death or life imprisonment
(2) Murder of the second degree: Mandatory life imprisonment
(3) Felony of the first degree (murder of the third degree): 20 years

Sources:
Pennsylvania Crimes Code § 2501
Pennsylvania Crimes Code § 15.66

Friday, January 9, 2009

Quick Harlow and Joe Update

While it would appear that nothing much is happening right now... it's actually been a busy day 'behind the scenes' today:

Harlow Cuadra's attorneys have filed their findings of fact and conclusion of law, for the motion to suppress evidence seized from the BMW. Meanwhile... Joseph Kerekes has to pay some more money, including the bill for a computer forensic expert, expert psychiatrist, and expert criminologist. This is in addition to the $655.73 and other fines he's already been ordered to restitute, after pleading guily to second-degree murder last month.

I'll detail both of these stories within the next few days.

Update 1/10/09: According to the Times Leader: A Luzerne County judge recently approved payments of more than $7,300 for two experts and a surveillance company hired by attorneys for homicide suspect Joseph Kerekes.

Kerekes, 34, was sentenced on Dec. 8 to life in prison after he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in the killing of Bryan Kocis, 44, in January 2007.

Kerekes’ attorneys, Shelley Centini and John Pike, hired forensic psychiatrist Dr. Richard E. Fischbein, of Kingston, Dr. Robert Johnson, of Herndon, Va., and Surveillance Technology Group, Inc., of North Wales, to assist in the defense.

According to receipts submitted to Court of Common Pleas Judge Peter Paul Olszewski Jr.:

Fischbein submitted a bill on Dec. 9 for $1,920, which included a review of a report by psychiatric expert Dr. John O’Brien, a telephone interview with Kerekes’ parents, and a meeting with Centini and Pike.

Johnson, a criminologist, submitted a bill on Dec. 17 for $400, which included a one-hour review of files and research on prison adjustment.

Surveillance Technology Group was hired as a computer forensic expert, and submitted a bill on Dec. 13 for $4,990.16, which included 41 hours of reviewing investigative records.

Olszewski on Jan. 3 approved the payments to Fischbein, Johnson and Surveillance Technology. Olszewski’s orders that approved the payments were released on Friday.

Wednesday, January 7, 2009

Harlow Cuadra's Trial... Step 1

Harlow Cuadra

With Harlow Cuadra's trial scheduled to begin on February 17, 2009, for the brutal slaying of Bryan Kocis, I thought I'd go ahead and post a guide as to what happens first: jury selection... and how that process is done. Since this is a capital case, Harlow's jury selection alone could easily take a week or more:

1. Jury Procedures
2. Examination and Challenges of the Trial Jurors
3. Juror Information Questionnaire
4. Examination and Challenges of Alternate Trial Jurors
5. Number of Peremptory Challenges
6. Exhaustion of the Jury Panel

Source: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Code

Jury Procedures

Rule 630. Juror Qualification Form, Lists of Trial Jurors, and Challgene to the Array.

(A) JUROR QUALIFICATION FORM AND LISTS OF TRIAL JURORS.

(1) The officials designated by law to select persons for jury service shall:

(a) devise, distribute, and maintain juror qualification forms as provided by law;

(b) prepare, publish, and post lists of the names of persons to serve as jurors as provided by law; and

(c) upon the request of the attorney for the Commonwealth or the defendant’s attorney, furnish the list containing the names of prospective jurors prepared pursuant to paragraph (A)(1)(b); and

(d) make available for review and copying copies of the juror qualification forms returned by the prospective jurors.

(2) The information provided on the juror qualification form shall be confidential and limited to questions of the jurors’ qualifications.

(3) The original and any copies of the juror qualification form shall not constitute a public record.

(B) CHALLENGE TO THE ARRAY.

(1) Unless opportunity did not exist prior thereto, a challenge to the array shall be made not later than 5 days before the first day of the week the case is listed for trial of criminal cases for which the jurors have been summoned and not thereafter, and shall be in writing, specifying the facts constituting the ground for the challenge.

(2) A challenge to the array may be made only on the ground that the jurors were not selected, drawn, or summoned substantially in accordance with law.

Examination and Challenges of the Trial Jurors

Rule 631. Examination and Challenges of the Trial Jurors.

(A) Voir dire of prospective trial jurors and prospective alternate jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defense attorney, and the defendant, with the judge’s consent.

(B) This oath shall be administered individually or collectively to the prospective jurors:

‘‘You do solemnly swear by Almighty God (or do declare and affirm) that you will answer truthfully all questions that may be put to you concerning your qualifications for service as a juror.’’

(C) Voir dire, including the judge’s ruling on all proposed questions, shall be recorded in full unless the recording is waived. The record will be transcribed only upon written request of either party or order of the judge.

(D) Prior to voir dire, each prospective juror shall complete the standard, confidential juror information questionnaire as provided in Rule 632. The judge may require the parties to submit in writing a list of proposed questions to be asked of the jurors regarding their qualifications. The judge may permit the defense and the prosecution to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or the judge may conduct the examination. In the latter event, the judge shall permit the defense and the prosecution to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as the judge deems proper.

(E) In capital cases, the individual voir dire method must be used, unless the defendant waives that alternative. In non-capital cases, the trial judge shall select one of the following alternative methods of voir dire, which shall apply to the selection of both jurors and alternates:

(1) INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE AND CHALLENGE SYSTEM.

(a) Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted individually and may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of other jurors.

(b) Challenges, both peremptory and for cause, shall be exercised alternately, beginning with the attorney for the Commonwealth, until all jurors are chosen. Challenges shall be exercised immediately after the prospective juror is examined. Once accepted by all parties, a prospective juror shall not be removed by peremptory challenge. Without declaring a mistrial, a judge may allow a challenge for cause at any time before the jury begins to deliberate, provided sufficient alternates have been selected, or the defendant consents to be tried by a jury of fewer than 12, pursuant to Rule 641.

(2) LIST SYSTEM OF CHALLENGES.

(a) A list of prospective jurors shall be prepared. The list shall contain a sufficient number of prospective jurors to total at least 12, plus the number of alternates to be selected, plus the total number of peremptory challenges (including alternates).

(b) Prospective jurors may be examined collectively or individually regarding their qualifications. If the jurors are examined individually, the examination may be conducted beyond the hearing and presence of other jurors.

(c) Challenges for cause shall be exercised orally as soon as the cause is determined.

(d) When a challenge for cause has been sustained, which brings the total number on the list below the number of 12 plus alternates, plus peremptory challenges (including alternates), additional prospective jurors shall be added to the list.

(e) Each prospective juror subsequently added to the list may be examined as set forth in paragraph (E)(2)(b).

(f) When the examination has been completed and all challenges for cause have been exercised, peremptory challenges shall then be exercised by passing the list between prosecution and defense, with the prosecution first striking the name of a prospective juror, followed by the defense, and alternating thereafter until all peremptory challenges have been exhausted. If either party fails to exhaust all peremptory challenges, the jurors last listed shall be stricken. The remaining jurors and alternates shall be seated. No one shall disclose which party peremptorily struck any juror.