Monday, July 14, 2008

IX. Motion for Severance

41. Denied.

42. Denied. Defendant Cuadra's defense is not substantially prejudiced by the joinder with Defendant Kerekes' case. Defendant Cuadra's defense is consistent, compatible and coordinated with Defendant Kerekes' defense. The Defendants defenses demonstrate alliance, not antagonism. Both Cuadra and Kerekes have agreed on Plan B, wherein both defendants are completely innocent. Under Plan B, Defendant Kerekes was slumbering at the Fox Ridge Inn, composing an e-mail to escort client. At 60 Midland Drive, Defendant Cuadra walked in 60 Midland Drive, Dallas, Pennsylvania; Defendant Cuadra smelled smoke and fled from the unfolding tragedy. Then Defendant Kerekes and Defendant Cuadra, apparently overcome by emotion, sped back to Virginia Beach. See Virginia Beach Prison Transcript #98, 101 which are attached hereto as Exhibits "5" and "6".

43. Denied. The Defendants, in loyal alliance, have agreed upon Plan B. Whatever Defendant Cuadra is speaking of, in terms of antagonism, is not delineated. Even if Defendant Cuadra can point to something that hints of antagonism, the fact that defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together. 11 Gribble, 863 A.2d at 462.

44. Denied. The Defendant does not point out what statements cause prejudice. The Commonwealth will play or read transcripts of the following conversation attached hereto:

a. Joseph Kerekes to Renee Martin: Defendant Kerekes outlines Plan B.

b. Joseph Kerekes and Harlow Cuadra: the Defendants agree on Plan B.

c. Joseph Kerekes to Renee Martin: redacted and read to the jury in accordance with Commonwealth v. Travers. 564 Pa. 362, 768 A.2d 845, 847 (2001): Defendant Kerekes acknowledges a trip to the Wilkes-Barre Walmart with Cuadra in which lighter fluid, a knife, KY jelly and condoms are purchased the day of the homicide.

45. Denied. The Defendant has not specified what he is referring to.

46. Denied.

47. Admitted in part. The death penalty stage is qualitatively different. The Defendant does not specify, denote or delineate what the risks are he speaks of. To the extent that the Defendant suggests that the courts or the prosecution are inattentive or lax in examining the pros and cons of joinder, the Commonwealth rejects that assumption.

48. Admitted in part. There should be scrutiny for all criminal cases to ensure they are fundamentally fair. The Commonwealth, the Defendant and the public all suffer if trials are not fundamentally fair for offenses as benign as a harassment case.

49. Admitted. This has occurred with multiple defendants in a capital case.

50. Denied. Redaction as set forth in the Travers decision provides the solution. The rest of this averment does not set forth how it applies in the instant case but appears to be inapt generalizations.

51. Denied. The United States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court have delineated what type of statements do not offend the Confrontation Clause. The Defendant fails to point out even a single statement that he is referring to.

52. Denied. The United States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court have delineated what type of statements do not offend the Confrontation Clause. The Defendant fails to point out even a single statement that he is referring to assist the Court in its evaluation.

53. Denied. The Defendant cites no case for this proposition. There is no such thing as a non-statutory aggravator. The fact that defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together." Gribble, 863 A.2d at 462

54. Denied. The fact that defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together." Gribble, 863 A.2d at 462 55. Denied. In Commonwealth. v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 526 Pa. 578 (Pa., 1991) Chester and Laird, were tried and found guilty of Murder in the First Degree with the jury imposing the penalty of death for both defendants in connection with the death of Anthony Milano. There are several cases akin to Chester i.e. joined or consolidated death penalty cases in Pennsylvania.

56. Denied. In Commonwealth. v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 526 Pa. 578 (Pa., 1991)Chester and Laird, were tried and found guilty of Murder in the First Degree with the jury imposing the penalty of death for both defendants in connection with the death of Anthony Milano. There are several cases akin to Chester i.e. joined or consolidated death penalty cases in Pennsylvania.

57. Denied.

58. Denied.

WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth moves this Honorable Court to deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.